POINT BY POINT SUMMARY
Prepared by Rabbi P. Feldman
of Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Yerushalayim
Rosh Kollel: Rabbi Mordecai Kornfeld
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Previous daf Zevachim 30
ZEVACHIM 26-30 - Dedicated to the leaders and participants in the Dafyomi
shiurim at the Young Israel of New Rochelle, by Andy & Nancy Neff
1) DIFFERENT INTENTIONS (cont.)
(a) (Mishnah): R. Yehudah says, the general rule is - if
intent Chutz li'Zmano came first, it is Pigul, there is
2) DO WE FOLLOW THE FIRST THING SAID?
(b) Question: According to R. Yochanan, 'the general rule'
comes to include intentions in one Avodah - but according
to Ilfa, what does this come to include?
(c) This is left difficult.
(d) (Mishnah - R. Meir): If Reuven said 'This (Chulin) animal
is Temuras (in place of my) Olah, Temuras Shelamim' - it
is Temuras Olah (i.e. it is an Olah);
(e) R. Yosi says, if he meant to say both from the beginning,
they both take effect (the animal will be sold, half the
money will be used to buy an Olah, half to buy a
Shelamim) - since he cannot say them simultaneously,
there is no reason to favor his first words;
1. If after saying 'Temuras Olah' he reconsidered and
said 'Temuras Shelamim', it is an Olah.
(f) Question: If he said 'Temuras Olah *v*Shelamim', what is
(g) Version #1 (Rashi) Question: If he said 'l'Chatzos' (half
should be Temuras Olah, half should be Temuras Shelamim),
what is the law?
(h) Version #2 (R. Chananel): If he said 'l'Chatzos' ('At
midday it should become Temuras Olah v'Shelamim' (so they
take effect simultaneously)), what is the law?
(i) Answer #1 (Abaye): Surely, even R. Meir agrees that both
(j) Question (Rava): But this is like different intentions in
slaughter, and R. Yehudah (argues with Chachamim and)
says that we follow the first intention (just like R.
(k) Answer (Abaye): You assume that slaughter is
instantaneous (i.e. until the majority of the Simanim are
cut is only *preparation*, cutting Mashehu (an
arbitrarily small amount) past half is the actual
slaughter - therefore, both intentions take effect
simultaneously at the moment slaughter is finished);
1. You are wrong - the entire cutting (of the Simanim,
until the majority are cut) is considered slaughter
(therefore, the intentions take effect one after the
(l) Question (Rava): But 'L'Chatzos' is like different
intentions in Kemitzah (which is instantaneous), and R.
Yehudah says that we follow the first intention!
(m) Answer (Abaye): The case is, he had one intention when
burning the Kometz, and the other intention later, when
burning the frankincense.
(n) Question (Rava): But R. Yehudah argues even regarding
Kemitzah of a Minchas Chotei (which has no frankincense)!
(o) Answer #1 (Abaye): No, he agrees in that case.
(p) Answer #2 (Rav Ashi): We could say that he argues, when
the intentions came during different steps (while
bringing the Kometz to the Mizbe'ach).
1. Rav Simi Bar Ashi holds like Abaye, Rav Huna bar
Noson holds like Rava.
(a) (Rav Dimi): R. Meir holds like R. Yehudah, we follow the
first thing said.
1. (Mishnah - R. Yehudah): The general rule is - if
intent Chutz li'Zmano came first, it is Pigul, there
(b) Question (Abaye): But Rabah bar bar Chanah cited R.
Yochanan to say that R. Meir and R. Yosi do not argue.
3) WHEN ARE INTENTIONS MIXED?
1. Objection: They do argue!
(c) Answer (Rav Dimi): I argue with Rabah bar bar Chanah, I
say that R. Meir argues with R. Yosi.
2. Answer: He means, they do not argue except for what
they explicitly argue about, not whether or not we
follow the first thing said.
3. (R. Yitzchak bar Yosef): All agree that if he said
'This should take effect (Temuras Olah), and then
this (Temuras Shelamim)', the latter does not take
4. All agree that if he said 'This should not take
effect unless this also takes effect', both take
5. They argue when he said 'Temuras Olah Temuras
i. R. Meir says, (if he wanted both to take
effect) he should have said 'Temuras Olah
v'Shelamim' - since he did not say this, this
shows that he tried to retract (but he cannot);
ii. R. Yosi says, he did not say 'Temuras Olah
v'Shelamim', for this would imply that half is
Temuras Olah, half is Temuras Shelamim (he
knows that this cannot be offered);
iii. He intended that the entire animal is Temurah
of an Olah and also of a Shelamim (he thought
that this can be offered).
(a) Question (Ula): What is the text of our Mishnah - k'Zayis
(tomorrow) k'Zayis (Chutz li'Mkomo), or k'Zayis
1. If the former, only in this case R. Yehudah follows
the first intention, but k'Zayis vek'Zayis, the
intentions are mixed, he admits that there is no
(b) Answer: We learn from the following:
2. If the latter, R. Yehudah considers even this to be
Prata (separate intentions), all the more so he says
so regarding k'Zayis k'Zayis.
(c) Levi: If one intended (to eat the same) k'Zayis tomorrow
b'Chutz (li'Mkomo), what is the law?
(d) Rebbi: A fine question! It is Pasul, there is no Kares.
(e) R. Shimon b'Rebbi: Why was it a good question - we
already learn this from our Mishnah!
1. (Mishnah): K'Zayis b'Chutz, k'Zayis tomorrow, or
vice-versa, or half a k'Zayis b'Chutz, and half a
k'Zayis tomorrow, or vice-versa, it is Pasul, there
is no Kares; (R. Yehudah says, if intent Chutz
li'Zmano came first, it is Pigul, there is Kares).
(f) Rebbi: Based on what I taught him, he asked properly.
2. They argue about intentions for different k'Zeisim,
but all agree that intentions about the same k'Zayis
are Klala (mixed), there is no Kares!
1. I taught you (R. Shimon) two cases (of Prata,
k'Zayis k'Zayis and k'Zayis vek'Zayis) - you
properly inferred that the third case (intentions
about the same k'Zayis) is Klala;
(g) Question: Which case did Rebbi teach to Levi?
2. I taught Levi one case (of Prata), he heard Rabanan
saying two cases. He was unsure whether I was
precise with him (the second case is Klala), and
Rabanan (mistakenly) extrapolated to the second
case, or if I taught both to them, and I omitted
teaching him one of them.
1. Suggestion: He taught him k'Zayis vek'Zayis.
(h) Answer: He taught him k'Zayis k'Zayis.
2. Rejection: If so, Levi would have known, all the
more so k'Zayis k'Zayis!
(i) Question: If Levi was unsure about k'Zayis vek'Zayis, why
didn't he ask about it?
(j) Answer: It was better to ask 'k'Zayis tomorrow b'Chutz,
for he will learn two things from the answer.
1. Had he asked k'Zayis vek'Zayis, and Rebbi answered
that it is Klala, Levi would indeed know that all
the more so, k'Zayis tomorrow b'Chutz is Klala;
(k) Question: The same applies to asking k'Zayis tomorrow
2. But if Rebbi would answer that it is Prata, he would
not know k'Zayis tomorrow b'Chutz.
1. If Rebbi will answer that it is Prata, Levi would
indeed know, all the more so, k'Zayis tomorrow
(l) Answer: Levi could derive it from Rebbi's response.
(Levi's question implies that Levi is sure that k'Zayis
vek'Zayis is Prata).
2. But if Rebbi would answer that it is Klala, Levi
would not know k'Zayis tomorrow b'Chutz.
1. If k'Zayis vek'Zayis is indeed Prata, Rebbi would
not be angry.
2. But if k'Zayis vek'Zayis is Klala, Rebbi would be
angry that Levi did not infer this (from the fact
that Rebbi only taught him k'Zayis k'Zayis), rather
assumed the opposite!