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Zevachim, 108


OPINIONS: The Gemara earlier (107b) records an argument between Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish regarding the make up of the k'Zayis which is necessary for one who offers parts of a Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash to be liable. Rebbi Yochanan maintains that even when a bone combines with the flesh to make a k'Zayis, the person will be Chayav, because things that are attached to Eimurin are considered like the Eimurin themselves. Reish Lakish argues and says that in order to be Chayav, one must offer a k'Zayis of something that normally is offered on the Mizbe'ach. Reish Lakish maintains that things that are attached to the Eimurin are *not* like the Eimurin themselves.

Rava inquires about one who offers, outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash, the head of a dove that is less than the size of a k'Zayis, and he adds salt to it, bringing the total size to a k'Zayis. Has the person transgressed the prohibition against offering a k'Zayis of a Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash? The Gemara says that this question is relevant according to the opinions of both Rebbi Yochanan and Reish Lakish. Even though Rebbi Yochanan maintains that bone can complete the amount of a k'Zayis, perhaps that is because bone is part of the bird. He might agree that salt -- which is not part of the bird -- might not complete the k'Zayis. Similarly, Reish Lakish might maintain that only bone does not add to the size, because there is no Mitzvah to put bones back on the Mizbe'ach if they fall off; bones are only on the Mizbe'ach because they were attached to the Eimurin. However, he might agree that salt -- which *should* be put back on the Mizbe'ach if it falls off -- should be able to complete a k'Zayis. The Gemara leaves this question unanswered.

Why does the Gemara say that salt should be put back on the Mizbe'ach if it falls off? What is the source for this rule?

(a) RASHI (DH Rosh Yonah) explains that this is an explicit commandment in the Torah. The Torah commands, "v'Lo Sashbis Melach Bris Elokecha" -- "You shall not hold back the salt of the covenant of your G-d" (Vayikra 2:13). This tells us not only that we must put salt on the Korbanos, but that we must also put salt back onto the Korban if it falls off of the Eimurin that are on the Mizbe'ach.

The SEFAS EMES has difficulty with this explanation of the Gemara. If one would offer the head of a dove, which is less than a k'Zayis, in the Beis ha'Mikdash, he definitely would not receive Malkus for not salting it. Almost all opinions agree with this (except perhaps for TOSFOS on 107b, DH Rebbi Yochanan), because of the rule that offering Eimurin which are less than a k'Zayis is not called "offering," and thus the requirement to bring salt with them does not apply (see also MINCHAS CHINUCH 120:8). Why, then, does the Gemara suggest that according to Reish Lakish, one must put the salt back on the head of the dove if it falls off of the Mizbe'ach? The head never required the salt in the first place, since it is less than a k'Zayis! One certainly should not be required to return the salt to its place!

(b) The PERUSH HA'MEYUCHAS LA'RACH (cited by the KNESES RISHONIM) appears to have a different explanation of the Gemara. He says that according to Reish Lakish, if the salt falls off, one would have to put it back on the Mizbe'ach, since it is considered to be attached to the Korban. What exactly does the Rach mean?

The BRISKER RAV (Chidushim to Menachos 11a) and the CHAZON ISH (Menachos 25:16) propose a similar explanation of the Gemara. They explain that the reason the salt must be put back on the Mizbe'ach is because it becomes part of the Korban that was placed on the Mizbe'ach, and not because of a special law regarding salt. Just as the Korban must be returned to the Mizbe'ach if it falls off, so, too, the salt must be returned to the Mizbe'ach if it falls off. The Chazon Ish says that the source for this is the Gemara in Menachos (21b). The Gemara there says that one transgresses the Isur of Me'ilah when one uses salt that was placed on Eimurin. This is derived from the verse, "The Kohanim will throw salt on them (the Eimurin), and they will offer them up as an Olah offering to Hashem" (Yechezkel 43:24). The Chazon Ish understands the Gemara there to be teaching us that the reason why one transgresses the Isur of Me'ilah when he uses the salt of a Korban is because the salt itself becomes part of the Korban.

The SHA'AR MORDECHAI suggests that this is also Rashi's intention when he says that the reason it must be put back is because of "v'Lo Sashbis." Rashi knows that the verse cited by the Gemara in Menachos teaches that the salt is part of the Korban. Rashi here is explaining the reason for why salt is considered part of the Korban. Since the Torah says that it must always be placed on the Korban, we can understand that the verse in Yechezkel is telling us that salt is considered like the Eimurin themselves, and it is unlike bones which are always considered separate entities once they come off of the Mizbe'ach. (Y. Montrose)


QUESTIONS: The Gemara (beginning on 108a) discusses the difference between one who slaughters a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash in order for a person to eat it, and one who gives a Korban as an offering to a person outside the Beis ha'Mikdash. In the first case, the person who slaughters the Korban transgresses the prohibition of slaughtering a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash, while in the second case, the person does not transgress that prohibition, but rather he transgresses the prohibition of Avodah Zarah. At one point, the Gemara says that the verse of "ha'Ish ha'Hu" -- "that man" (Vayikra 17:4), which is stated with regard to slaughter, shows that only an individual who slaughters is Chayav, while two people who hold a knife and slaughter the animal together are not Chayav. The Gemara asks that we find a similar verse of "ha'Ish ha'Hu" with regard to offering a Korban (Vayikra 17:9), and thus we should learn from that verse that two people who offer a Korban together outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash are exempt. The Gemara answers that this verse teaches something else -- it teaches that one is exempt when he offers a Korban b'Shogeg (accidentally), b'Ones (against his will), and Mut'eh (a mistaken offering).
(a) Why do we need a verse to teach us that one who offers b'Ones is exempt? An Ones is always exempt from liability for his actions! The Gemara (see Nedarim 27a) derives from a verse in the Torah that "Ones Rachmana Patrei" -- the Torah exempts one who is forced to sin!

(b) Why do we need a verse to exempt a Shogeg from the punishment of Kares? One who sins b'Shogeg is never Chayav Kares, but rather he must bring a Korban! (TOSFOS DH Shogeg)

(a) There are two approaches in the Rishonim to answer this question.
1. TOSFOS explains that the Ones mentioned in our Gemara does not refer to one who is forced. Rather, it refers to one who thinks that it is permitted to offer Korbanos outside the Beis ha'Mikdash (this is referred to elsewhere as "Omer Mutar").

The TZON KODASHIM has difficulty with Tosfos' answer. In all other places in the Gemara, Tosfos takes the approach that a case of "Omer Mutar" is *not* considered a case of Ones! For example, Tosfos in Shabbos (68b, DH Aval Tinok) writes that who is "Omer Mutar" is considered to be a Shogeg, except that an "Omer Mutar" who kills is not considered Shogeg and is not sent to an Ir Miklat, since there are a number of verses from which we learn the various levels of accidental killing that are exempt from going to an Ir Miklat. (According to Rava in Makos (7b), this question on Tosfos is even more difficult, because Rava maintains that an "Omer Mutar" is exempt from Galus only because he is considered *worse* (i.e. more intentional) than a Shogeg, and he certainly is not an Ones.) Besides for an act of accidental killing, the Torah always considers such a person as a Shogeg. Why, then, does Tosfos say that the Gemara here means "Omer Mutar" when it says Ones?

2. The RASHBA in Kidushin (43a) answers in the name of the RA'AVAD that we might have thought that slaughtering a Korban outside the Beis ha'Mikdash is included in the category of "Yehareg v'Al Ya'avor" -- "one should be killed rather than transgress," because the verse says, "Dam Shafach" -- "he has spilled blood" (Vayikra 17:4), with regard to one who slaughters a Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. We might have compared this Isur to the Isur of murder, for which one must give his life in order not to transgress, even when he is forced to do the Isur. Therefore, we need the verse of "ha'Hu" to teach that an Ones indeed is exempt, and this Isur is not comparable to murder.

(b) The Rishonim also give two answers to why a verse is needed to exempt from Kares one who unintentionally, b'Shogeg, offers a Korban outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash.

1. TOSFOS answers that we might have thought that if the unintentional transgressor eventually fails to bring a Korban for his transgression, then he indeed is punished with Kares. This is because the Torah says the words, v'Nislach Lo" -- "and it will be forgiven for him" (see, for example, Vayikra 5:10) only after the Torah says that one should bring a Korban for his sin, which implies that he receives atonement only upon bringing his Korban, but, until he brings his Korban, he is Chayav Kares. Therefore, we need an additional verse to teach that one who sins b'Shogeg is not Chayav Kares.

However, this is difficult to understand. Why would we have thought, as Tosfos suggests, that an unintentional offender should receive the same punishment as one who willfully sins?

The GEVUROS SHEMONIM (note 67) gives two possible explanations for Tosfos. One possibility is that when someone realizes that he accidentally transgressed a severe sin which is punishable with Kares, and he does not care enough to bring a Korban for atonement, his uncaring attitude makes his sin considered as if it was done on purpose. Second, the Gevuros Shemonim suggests that we might have thought that, in this case, the person will be Chayav Kares for his unintentional sin, because it is possible for him to retroactively remove the sin that he did. He can annul his original Neder that made the animal into a Korban, thereby taking away the sin of slaughtering the animal outside of the Beis ha'Mikdash. Since he does not attempt to remove his sin when he has the opportunity to do so, it is considered as though he did the sin on purpose.

(b) The RASHBA gives a similar answer to that of Tosfos, but he adds another explanation. The Rashba explains that the exemption for one who sins b'Shogeg indeed does not need a verse. However, once the Torah gives a verse to exempt one who sins b'Ones (as explained above), the Chachamim also included in this teaching sins of Shogeg and Mut'eh.

The RAMBAN and RITVA in Kidushin (43a) give this answer as well, but they give it with regard to the first question (why the Torah needs to exempt one who is Ones). They give Tosfos' reason for why we need a verse to exempt one who sins b'Shogeg, and they say that once the Torah gives a verse to exempt Shogeg, the Chachamim included in the teaching the sins of Ones and Mut'eh (for which we indeed need no verse to exempt). (Y. Montrose)

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