THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
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Rosh Kollel: Rav Mordecai Kornfeld
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ZEVACHIM 64-65 - sponsored by Harav Ari Bergmann of Lawrence, N.Y., out of
love for the Torah and for those who study it.
1) HAVING A WRONGFUL THOUGHT FOR AN "OLAS HA'OF" AND A "CHATAS HA'OF"
QUESTION: The Mishnah lists a number of cases in which a Kohen has a
wrongful thought of Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo with regard to a bird
offering. In one of the cases mentioned in the Mishnah, the Kohen has in
mind to eat half of a k'Zayis of the bird offering Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz
l'Mekomo, and he also has in mind to burn half of a k'Zayis of the bird
offering Chutz l'Zemano or Chutz l'Mekomo. In such a case, the Korban
remains valid, because a thought of eating and a thought of burning do not
combine, and thus the minimum amount (a k'Zayis) needed to disqualify the
Korban through a wrongful thought was not achieved.
The TIFERES YISRAEL and others ask that this teaching of the Mishnah seems
unnecessary. Even if the two thoughts could combine, the thoughts still
could not disqualify the Korban! The Mishnah earlier (29b, 35a) states that
only a thought to eat, Chutz l'Zemano, a part of the Korban which is
supposed eaten, or a thought to burn, Chutz l'Zemano, a part of the Korban
which is normally burned, can disqualify the Korban. A thought to burn part
of a Korban that is supposed to be eaten does *not* disqualify the Korban.
An Olas ha'Of is completely burned on the Mizbe'ach, and none of it is
eaten, while a Chatas ha'Of is completely eaten by the Kohanim, and none of
it is burned! Hence, having a thought to *eat* any amount of an Olas ha'Of,
or to *burn* any amount of a Chatas ha'Of, cannot disqualify the Korban!
Why, then, does the Mishnah discuss this case of having a thought to eat
half of a k'Zayis and to burn half of a k'Zayis of a bird offering?
(a) The TIFERES YISRAEL, RASHASH (31b), OR SAME'ACH (Hilchos Pesulei
ha'Mukdashin 13:1) and others write that the Mishnah is listing cases with
regard to a bird offering that correspond to the cases that it lists earlier
(end of the second Perek) with regard to an animal offering. Although this
case does not actually apply to a bird offering, as described above, the
Mishnah mentions it here in order to parallel the earlier Mishnah.
(b) The KEREN ORAH answers that the Mishnah here is teaching a novel idea
according to Rebbi Eliezer. Rebbi Eliezer (28a) argues with the principle
mentioned above, and he maintains that a thought to eat a part of the Korban
that is supposed to be burned, or a thought to burn a part which is supposed
to be eaten, *does* disqualify the Korban. The Mishnah is teaching that even
according to Rebbi Eliezer, a bird does not become Pasul when one has a
thought to eat half of a k'Zayis and to burn half of a k'Zayis, because
thoughts of eating and burning do not combine.
(c) The SEFAS EMES answers based on the Gemara earlier (31a). The Gemara
there teaches that when the fire of the Mizbe'ach consumes the Korban, this
is called "eating." Why, then, does a thought of eating half of a k'Zayis
and a thought of burning half of a k'Zayis not combine? The Gemara there
answers that they *would* combine if the Kohen specifically has in mind a
thought of eating and a thought of the "eating of fire" (while the Mishnah
there (29b, 35a) is referring to thoughts of eating and "burning"). However,
a thought of "burning" does not combine with a thought of "eating" -- even a
thought of the "eating of fire."
The Sefas Emes explains that when the Mishnah here mentions thoughts of
eating and burning with regard to the bird offering, it is referring
specifically to the type of eating that is done with an Olas ha'Of -- the
fire's consumption of the bird. However, since the Kohen has a thought of
"burning," it does not combine with the thought of the "eating of fire."
(d) The Sefas Emes proposes another answer to this question. It is possible
that when the Mishnah mentions that the Kohen has a thought to eat half of a
k'Zayis and a thought to burn half of a k'Zayis, it means a thought to eat
half of a k'Zayis of a *Chatas ha'Of* and a thought to burn half of a
k'Zayis of an *Olas ha'Of.* The Mishnah is teaching that the thoughts do not
Why, though, would we have thought that such thoughts could combine in the
first place? Why should this Korban become disqualified because of a thought
that the Kohen had about an entirely different Korban?
The YAD BINYAMIN explains the Sefas Emes based on the words of the IBN EZRA
(Vayikra 5:7). With regard to the Korban Oleh v'Yored, the Torah requires
that one who is unable to bring a Chatas Behemah, an animal offering, must
bring instead a Chatas ha'Of and an Olas ha'Of. Why must he bring an Olas
ha'Of as well? The Ibn Ezra explains that since none of the limbs of the
Chatas ha'Of are burned on the Mizbe'ach (since the Kohanim eat all of it),
an Olas ha'Of must be brought in order for there to be some part of the
Korban burned on the Mizbe'ach to take the place of the limbs of the Chatas
Behemah. (See also OR SAME'ACH.)
In the case of a Chatas ha'Of and Olas ha'Of being offered in place of a
Chatas Behemah, both bird offerings are performing the function of a single
Korban. Therefore, it indeed is logical to assume that thoughts about each
one would combine to disqualify them! (Y. Montrose)
2) SEVERING BOTH "SIMANIM" OF A "CHATAS HA'OF"
OPINIONS: The Mishnah (65a) states that if, during the Melikah of the bird
being offered as a Chatas ha'Of, one severs both Simanim in the bird's neck,
the Korban becomes Pasul. This is based on the verse that says with regard
to a Chatas ha'Of, "v'Lo Yavdil" -- "and he shall not separate" (Vayikra
5:8). The Gemara says that the Mishnah is not following the view of Rebbi
Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon, who said, "I have heard that one may sever [the two
Simanim of] a Chatas ha'Of [and it remains valid]."
Rav Chisda explains that the argument is based on a different argument --
whether or not the failure to perform Mitzuy (pressing the blood out against
the wall of the Mizbe'ach) renders the Chatas ha'Of invalid. The Tana Kama
maintains that failure to perform the Mitzuy disqualifies the Korban.
Therefore, one may not sever the Simanim of a Chatas ha'Of, because doing so
would constitute performing an act of an Olas ha'Of for a Chatas ha'Of (as
will be explained below). Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon maintains that the
failure to perform Mitzuy does *not* disqualify the Korban, and, therefore,
cutting both Simanim is not considered to be an act of an Olas ha'Of, but
rather merely an act of cutting.
How does this explain the argument between the Tana Kama and Rebbi Elazar
b'Rebbi Shimon with regard to whether or not one may sever the two Simanim
of a Chatas ha'Of?
(a) RASHI (DH Tana Kama Savar, and DH v'Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon Savar)
explains that the Tana Kama maintains that severing both Simanim of a Chatas
ha'Of renders it invalid because the same Avodah which is done for an Olas
ha'Of (Melikah with Havdalah, followed by Mitzuy) is being done for the
Chatas ha'Of. If the Kohen cuts both Simanim of the Chatas ha'Of, then he
must perform Mitzuy right away, because if he waits, all of the blood will
flow out of the bird. Thus, the Kohen is performing the same Avodah as he
performs for an Olas ha'Of.
Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon agrees that if the Kohen actually performs this
sequence of procedures (Melikah with Havdalah, followed by Mitzuy) for a
Chatas ha'Of, the Chatas ha'Of becomes Pasul. However, since he maintains
that the Korban is valid even if no Mitzuy is done, it is possible for the
Chatas ha'Of to remain valid even if Havdalah was done, because the Kohen
does not have to do the Mitzuy, and thus even when both Simanim are cut, the
Avodah done for the Chatas ha'Of is *not* the same as the Avodah done for
the Olas ha'Of.
Rashi understands that according to both Tana'im, the verse of "v'Lo Yavdil"
is not a prohibition against cutting both Simanim of a Chatas ha'Of. Rather,
it is a prohibition against performing the Avodah of a Chatas ha'Of in the
manner of the Avodah of an Olas ha'Of. This prohibition is transgressed only
by doing both Havdalah *and* Mitzuy (unlike the simple meaning of the words
in the verse). When Rav Chisda says that Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon
maintains that Havdalah is just an act of cutting, he means that Havdalah
without Mitzuy will not make the Korban like an Olas ha'Of, and therefore it
is considered merely like cutting.
(b) TOSFOS (DH v'Rebbi Elazar) argues with Rashi's explanation. Tosfos
explains that the prohibition of "v'Lo Yavdil" is, as the words imply, a
prohibition against doing Havdalah alone. How, then, can Rebbi Elazar
b'Rebbi Shimon maintain that a Chatas ha'Of to which Havdalah is done can
remain a valid Korban? Tosfos answers that Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon is
discussing a case in which the Haza'as ha'Dam was done before the Havdalah.
Since the necessary Avodos involving the blood of the Chatas ha'Of were
already performed, cutting the Simanim at this time no longer renders the
Korban invalid. However, Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon would agree that if the
Havdalah was done before the Haza'as ha'Dam, then the Korban would be Pasul,
since its Avodah was done like that of an Olas ha'Of.
The KEREN ORAH and CHAZON ISH understand that Tosfos not only disagrees with
Rashi's explanation that the problem with cutting both Simanim of the Chatas
ha'Of is that one is doing both Havdalah and Mitzuy, but he also disagrees
with Rashi's reasoning. According to Rashi, the verse of "v'Lo Yavdil" is
not a prohibition against cutting both Simanim of a Chatas ha'Of. Rather, it
is a prohibition against performing the Avodah of a Chatas ha'Of in the
manner of the Avodah of an Olas ha'Of. According to Tosfos, the verse
specifically prohibits the action of cutting both Simanim of a Chatas ha'Of.
Tosfos maintains that there is only one Tana in the Gemara who understands
"v'Lo Yavdil" differently -- Rebbi Shimon ben Elyakim. He understands that
Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon's opinion is that the verse of "v'Lo Yavdil"
does not mean "and he shall not separate," but rather it means, "and he
*does not need* to separate." According to this interpretation, Rebbi Shimon
ben Elyakim maintains that even if the Havdalah was done *before* the
Haza'as ha'Dam, the Chatas ha'Of remains valid, because there is no verse
which tells us that a Chatas ha'Of must be done without Havdalah.
(c) Tosfos later (on 66a) quotes RABEINU TAM who says that even Rebbi Shimon
ben Elyakim would agree with Tosfos' earlier explanation of Rebbi Elazar
b'Rebbi Shimon's opinion. He agrees that there is a prohibition against
cutting the Simanim before Haza'as ha'Dam. When Rebbi Shimon ben Elyakim
says that "v'Lo Yavdil" means "and he does not need to separate," he
understands that the verse is addressing a situation in which the Kohen does
Havdalah after Haza'as ha'Dam and before Mitzuy. We might have thought that
a Kohen who is about to press the blood of a Chatas ha'Of on the Mizbe'ach
should definitely sever the Simanim first, since this will cause more blood
to be pressed onto the Mizbe'ach. Rebbi Shimon ben Elyakim learns that,
according to Rebbi Elazar b'Rebbi Shimon, the verse if "v'Lo Yavdil" teaches
that this is not necessary. (Y. Montrose)