ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Yevamos 117
YEVAMOS 116-119 - have been sponsored through the generous contribution of
Mr. Uri Wolfson and family
(a) 'If they (Beis Shamai) can extrapolate from the Kesubah, then why should
we not extrapolate from the Torah', said Rav Chisda. From the Pasuk "Yakum
al-Sheim Achiv" - he extrapolated that any Yavam who performed Yibum
inherits his brother, even one who did so on the basis of the Yevamah's
(b) Rav Nachman teaches that, depending upon what she says, a woman who
testifies that her husband has died, is not always believed. Beis-Din will
not believe her - if she testifies exclusively n order to claim her Kesubah
(without alluding to marriage).
(c) However, should she ask for permission both to remarry and for her
Kesubah, she is probably believed - because a person tends to take advantage
of opportunities that avail themselves (like the Hebrew saying 'Im K'var Az
K'var') and, once she is putting in a request for permission to marry, she
asks for her Kesubah too.
(d) Even if she puts her Kesubah first we are not sure whether she is
believed or not. She may be believed even then - because for all we know,
she thinks that claiming her Kesubah is what will grant her permission to
marry (provided she also mentions marriage).
(a) Anyone who testifies that a man died, permits the man's wife to the
Yavam. There are only five exceptions. The basic reason that covers all
five is - the fear that each of them hates the woman concerned and set out
to make her sin.
1. Her mother-in-law hates her - because, she says to herself, 'This woman
comes and eats up all my hard work' (the money and property that she brought
into the marriage - Nichsei mi'Lug and Nechsei Tzon Barzel, part of which
they gave to their son).
(c) We know that her Tzarah hates her. Her Yavam's ...
2. Her mother-in-law's daughter - because *she* says 'This woman comes and
eats up all the hard work of my parents, and I get nothing'.
1. ... wife - hates her because she anticipates becoming her Tzarah.
(d) All of these women are nevertheless believed to bring her Get from
overseas. We are not afraid that there too, they will set out to cause her
to sin - because, unlike here, where we rely entirely on their testimony,
there, we rely mainly on the Get itself.
2. ... daughter - hates her for the same reason, because she foresees her
becoming her mother's Tzarah and eating up all of her mother's work.
(a) We are not sure whether the daughter of her husband's *father* (who is
not the daughter of his mother) hates her too. She might ...
1. ... be different than the daughter of her husband's *mother* - because in
the latter case, it may well be that the daughter only hates her
sister-in-law, because her mother does ('like mother, like daughter').
(b) We reject the proof that the Tana of the Beraisa, who says that there
are only five women who are not believed (and not six) comes to preclude the
daughter of her husband's father - on the grounds that the reason for the
daughter of her mother-in-law might be the same as that of the daughter of
her father-in-law (because she accuses her of eating-up all the property of
her mother), in which case the two of them are really one.
2. ... nevertheless hate her, too - because of the money and property that
would be available to her, if not for this woman, who is already married to
one of her brothers.
(a) Rebbi Yehudah (in a Beraisa) adds Eishes Av (her step-mother) and Kalah
(her daughter-in-law) to the five. The Rabbanan do not list them - because
Eishes Av is included in bas ha'Ba'al, and Kalah, in Chamosah (both of which
are opposites and which are already included).
(b) According to Rebbi Yehudah, a woman tends to hate ...
1. ... her mother-in-law - because she (the mother-in-law) always informs on
her to her son.
(c) Nevertheless, the Rabbanan list only five and not seven - because, in
their opinion, a woman hates her mother-in-law because her mother-in-law
hates her, and she hates her stepdaughter because her stepdaughter hates her
(as we explained earlier). The basis for this is the Pasuk in Mishlei
"ke'Mayim ha'Panim le'Panim".
2. ... step-daughter - because she always informs on her to her father.
(d) According to Rebbi Yehudah - "ke'Mayim ha'Panim le'Panim" refers to
Torah-study (similar to the Mishnah in Pirkei Avos 'le'Fum Tza'ara Agra');
or that one's success in Torah depends upon the warmth that his Rebbe
displays when teaching him.
(a) 'Chamosah ha'Ba'ah le'Achar mi'Ka'an' is - the mother of the Yavam who
is not the mother of her husband (i.e. the second wife of her
(b) Rav Acha bar Ivya cites the B'nei Eretz Yisrael, who asked whether
'Chamosah ha'Ba'ah le'Achar mi'Ka'an' is believed or not. She might be
believed - because she is not yet his mother-in-law, and does not therefore
feel any hatred towards her at this stage.
(c) She would be believed, more than a 'Tzarah ha'Ba'ah le'Achar mi'Ka'an' -
because in the case of the latter, where the cause for the hatred is
personal, we have no doubts that the Tzarah anticipated the future, whereas
a mother-in-law, whose hatred is not personal, but based on monetary
considerations, may well only contend with the present.
(a) If a woman testifies that first her husband died overseas and then her
father-in-law, she is ...
1. ... believed vis-a-vis herself ...
(b) The Chidush of this Beraisa is - that even though she also testifies
that her husband died, in which case the relationship with her mother-in-law
has terminated, she is nevertheless not believed.
2. ... but not vis-a-vis her mother-in-law.
(c) She is not believed vis-a-vis her mother-in-law - because we suspect
that, in fact, her husband did not die either, and that she only said that
he did in order to cause her mother-in-law to sin.
(d) Assuming that she is lying and that both men are still alive, in spite
of the fact that her husband is still overseas and that her mother-in-law
cannot currently inform him about her misdeeds (according to Rebbi
Yehudah?), there is nevertheless no proof from there that a person contends
with the future and that therefore, a 'Chamosah ha'Ba'ah le'Achar mi'Ka'an'
should not be believed either - because the hatred towards a current
Chamosah, from whom the daughter-in-law has already suffered, is different
than that of a woman who has yet to become her mother-in-law.
(a) The Tana of our Mishnah says, that if one witness testifies that the man
died, and ...
1. ... one witness testifies that he is still alive - she may remain with
her husband to whom she is already married.
(b) And when two witnesses testify that he died, and one testifies that he
is still alive - then she is even permitted to marry Lechatchilah.
2. ... two witnesses testify that he is still alive - she must leave her
husband, even if she is already married to him.
(a) In light of what Ula said, it is difficult to understand why (in the
first of the above cases) the Tana says that it is only if she is already
married that she may remain with her husband, and why she is not permitted
to marry Lechatchilah. Ula said - that whenever the Torah believed one
witness, he has the power of two witnesses, and any witness who subsequently
contradicts him is not believed.
We learned in the Seifa of our Mishnah that, if two witnesses testified that
the man died, and one testified that he is still alive - we believe the two,
and permit the woman to marry Lechatchilah. Assuming that the author of the
Seifa too, is Rebbi Nechemyah, the Tana is coming to teach us here that not
only do we follow the majority to go le'Chumra (like we saw in the middle
case - where the one witness testifies that he died and the two, that he did
not), but we even follow them to go le'Kula.
(b) So, in order to conform with Ula's statement, we establish the Mishnah
when Beis-Din permitted her to marry before the second witness arrived, and
it concludes 'Lo Seitzei me'Heteirah ha'Rishon'.
(c) We establish the middle case (when *two* witnesses testify that the man
is still alive) like Rebbi Nechemyah. Otherwise, it would not be necessary
to inform us that one witness is not believed against two. According to
the first Lashon - Rebbi Nechemyah says wherever the Torah believed one
witness, we nevertheless follow the majority opinion (always). Consequently,
the testimony of two women following the testimony of one witness (even if
it is that of a man), is like the testimony of two men that follows that of
one man. Consequently, our Mishnah speaks even when two women testified
after one man (and she must leave her husband).
(d) In the second Lashon, had the first witness been a *man*, even Rebbi
Nechemyah would concede that even a hundred women who came afterwards to
contradict his testimony would be considered like one witness (who cannot
uproot the testimony of the first witness). Our Mishnah therefore speaks -
when two women testify after one *woman*.
(a) If two Tzaros arrive from overseas, one of whom testifies that their
husband died, and the other, that he is still alive - then the former is
permitted to marry, whereas the latter is not.
(b) According to Rebbi Meir, if one of the Tzaros testifies that their
husband died naturally, and the other, that he was killed - neither of them
is permitted to marry (seeing as they contradict each other).
(c) Due to the fact that each of the women testifies that their husband
died, Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi Shimon permit them both to marry.
(a) The Seifa of the Mishnah says that, if one witness testifies that he
died and the other one, that he did not (even if the two witnesses were
women) - they are not permitted to marry.
(b) The Seifa speaks - when the second woman arrived in Beis-Din before they
had permitted the first one to marry.