ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Sotah 18
(a) Rava invalidates a Megilas Sotah that is written on two columns - because the
Pasuk writes 'ba'Sefer', implying one Sefer and not two or three Sefarim.
(b) And he learns from the Pasuk "ve'Asah Lah ha'Kohen es Kol ha'Torah ha'Zos" - that
he needs to place the entire Megilah into the water at once, and not each letter
after he has already erased the previous one.
(a) "Ve'asah Lah" implies that the Megilas Sotah must be written for that particular
Sotah (and not for another). Rava thinks that two Megilos might not be Kasher if they
are placed in the same cup of water, even if they were written for two Sotos -
because it is possible, he says, that like the writing, the erasing needs to be
performed specifically for that particular Sotah.
(b) And assuming that we require ...
1. ... the erasing to be performed for the actual Sotah, we might even invalidate two
Megilos that were written separately and placed into two cups, if they were then
poured into one cup - because each Sotah requires her own cup.
2. ... each Sotah to drink her own cup, we might even invalidate the previous case,
if they subsequently poured the water into two cups before the two Sotos drank it -
because perhaps we will apply the principle 'Ein Bereirah' (the water that each one
drank is not retroactively hers).
(a) Rava also asks whether the Sotah will have performed her obligation if she placed
a fibrous substance into the cup, and then sucked the water that it had absorbed
(according to the explanation of the Aruch), or if she drank from a straw. She might
not have fulfilled her obligation - because that is not the way people normally
(b) Rav Ashi - asks whether the Sotah will have fulfilled her obligation if some of
the water spilled (a She'eilah which remains unanswered).
(a) Rava rejects Rav's contention that when the Torah writes two Shevu'os, one
pertains to before the Megilah is written, and the other, to afterwards - on the
grounds that both Pesukim are written before the erasing.
(b) So Rava explains - that one refers to a Shevu'ah with a curse (on the assumption
that she is guilty) and the other, to a Shevu'ah without a curse (on the assumption
that she is innocent).
(c) Rava rejects Rav Amram Amar Rav, who defines a Shevu'ah with an Alah as
'Mashbi'eini Alayich she'Lo Nitmeis, she'Im Nitmeis Yavo'u Bach', on the grounds that
in that case, the Alah and the Shevu'ah are unconnected - so he amends the wording to
'Mashbi'eini Alayich she'Im Nitmeis Yavo'u Bach'.
(d) Rav Ashi rejects Rava's explanation because, in that case, there is only an Alah,
but no Shevu'ah. So he finally amend Rava's definition to read 'Mashbi'eini Alayich
she'Lo Nitmeis, ve'Im Nitmeis Yavo'u Bach'
(a) Following the Alah and the Shevu'ah, the Sotah would respond with 'Amen, Amen',
to cover both of the them, and to cover any man other than the one about whom her
husband warned her. When the Tana of our Mishnah mean adds that the two Amens also
cover 'Arusah u'Nesu'ah, Shomeres Yavam u'Kenusah' - he is referring to two
independent cases, 'Arusah u'Nesu'ah' refers to a married woman and 'Shomeres Yavam
u'Kenusah' to a Yevamah.
(b) According to the Tana Kama - the double Amen also implies 'Amen she'Lo Nitmeisi,
ve'Im Nitmeisi, Yavo'u Bi'.
(c) According to Rebbi Meir, this list also incorporates future acts of adultery on
the woman's part (so it therefore includes 'Amen she'Lo Nitmeisi, Amen she'Lo
(a) The second Amen covers any seclusion - from the time of the husband's engagement
(according to everyone), until his divorce (according to Rebbi Meir).
(b) If a divorced woman secludes herself with another man, and her husband remarries
her, the second Amen (by a subsequent Kinuy and S'tirah) will not cover that
seclusion - because the adultery of a divorced woman does not forbid her to her first
husband (and, as our Mishnah concludes, any act of seclusion that does not forbid a
wife on her husband, is not covered by the second Amen.
(c) Living with another man not forbid a divorcee to return to her husband - because
the Torah specifically forbids a woman to return to her first husband only if she
married someone else after her divorce, but not if she only lived with him.
(a) Based on the previous statement, Rav Hamnuna proves from the fact the Tana of our
Mishnah includes Shomeres Yavam u'Kenusah - that a Shomeres Yavam who commits
adultery with another man is forbidden to the Yavam (even though she only contravened
an ordinary La'av).
(b) In Eretz Yisrael however, they refuted Rav Hamnuna's proof. According to them,
she is not forbidden to the Yavam through having committed adultery. They justify our
Mishnah mentioning Shomeres Yavam u'Kenusah - by establishing its author as Rebbi
Akiva, in whose opinion Kidushin do not take effect on Chayvei La'avin, giving them
the Din of Chayvei Ka'res (but according to the Rabbanan, the Mishnah would not have
inserted Shomeres Yavam u'Kenusah).
(c) Rebbi Yirmiyah asked whether the second Amen also covers the previous marriage,
either his own or his brother's. We cannot learn this from our Mishnah, which
explicitly says 'Arusah u'Nesu'ah, Shomeres Yavam and K'nusah' - because, as we
explained in our Mishnah, the Tana is dealing with two independent cases.
(d) We resolve Rebbi Yirmiyah's She'eilah - from the Seifa of our Mishnah, 'Zeh
ha'K'lal ... ', from which we can infer that whenever such an act would forbid her on
her husband, the second Amen incorporates it, which is the case in both She'eilos.
(a) When Rebbi Meir says that the husband's warning covers future acts of seclusion -
he does not mean that the water works retroactively (see Poras Yosef), but from the
time that she commits adultery the second time.
(b) Rav Ashi asks whether, according to Rebbi Meir, a man's warning to his wife can
take effect now for when he divorces her and remarries her. We resolve this She'eilah
from our Mishnah - because the Tana only says that it does not work in a case where
she committed adultery whilst she was divorced (since then, she does not become
forbidden to him), from which we can infer that if she committed adultery after he
remarried her, then it does.
(a) The Tana Kama of the Beraisa learns from the Pasuk "Zos *Toras* ha'Kena'os" -
that a woman can (become a Sotah and) drink twice.
(b) Whereas Rebbi Yehudah learns from "*Zos*" - that she cannot.
(c) Rebbi Yehudah establishes the testimony of Nechunyah Chofer Shichin that a woman
can drink twice - when she had two husbands (i.e. if her first husband warned her,
then died or divorced her and she married again).
(d) The Rabbanan say that even then, she does not drink a second time.
(a) The problem with the Tana Kama and the latter Rabbanan is - how do they learn
"Zos" and "Toras" respectively?
***** Hadran Alach Hayah Meivi *****
(b) Everybody agrees that a woman ...
1. ... cannot drink twice - in a case of one husband and one adulterer (from
(c) Consequently, they argue when there is one husband and two adulterers or two
husbands and one adulterer. The Tana Kama includes all cases from "Toras" and
excludes only the case of one husband and one adulterer from "Zos". According to
2. ... can drink twice - in a case of two husbands and two adulterers (from
1. ... the latter Rabbanan - we exclude all cases from "Zos", except for two husbands
and two adulterers, which we include from "Toras".
(d) The Tana Kama evidently maintains that "Toras" is more all-inclusive than "Zos"
is exclusive, and the Rabbanan hold the opposite. According to Rebbi Yehudah, the
Torah left it to the Chachamim to Darshen as they saw fit, and they found it more
logical to Darshen "Zos" to exclude one husband and two adulterers from drinking
twice rather than two husbands and (even) one adulterer - on the grounds that once
the woman is found to be innocent with that husband, we can assume that it is he who
is out to make trouble for his wife, irrespective of who the so-called adulterer is)
2. ... Rebbi Yehudah - "Zos excludes two cases (when there is one husbands, even if
there are two adulterers); and "Toras comes to include two cases (when there are two
husbands, even if there is only one adulterer).