THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
brought to you by Kollel Iyun Hadaf of Har Nof
Rosh Kollel: Rav Mordecai Kornfeld
Ask A Question about the Daf
1) A BARREL WITH A STONE ON TOP AND WINE INSIDE
QUESTION: Even though the Mishnah says that one may lift a barrel and shake
off a stone that lies on top of it, that applies only if the stone was
mistakenly left on top. If the stone was purposely left there, the Gemara
explains, the barrel is a Basis l'Davar ha'Asur.
2) COOKED HIS GOOSE
REBBI AKIVA EIGER, citing the MEKOR BARUCH (#3), questions why the barrel
should be considered a Basis l'Davar ha'Asur. The Gemara makes it clear
that the barrel contains wine in it. If so, it should not become a Basis
l'Davar ha'Asur, since it is a Basis for a permissible item (the wine) as
well! (One of the conditions required in order for an object to be a Basis
l'Davar ha'Asur is that it serves only the Muktzah item and no permitted
item (Daf 142a, see Background section).
(a) The MEKOR BARUCH answers that apparently we view the opening on the top
of the barrel, where the stone is resting, as separate from the bottom of
the barrel. The permissible item (the wine) is in the bottom part, while
the Muktzah item (the stone) is on the top; since the top of the barrel is
considered a Basis l'Davar ha'Asur, the barrel may not be moved.
This answer does not seem to conform to the opinion of the RITVA earlier in
Shabbos (44b; see Insights there) who said that if a Muchni (wheel) is
attached to a wagon and there is a Muktzah item resting on the Muchni, one
*may* move the Muchni, since the Muchni and the wagon are all considered
*one* object, and not two separate objects.
(b) It could be that the barrel cannot be considered a Basis for a
permissible item since the wine is not accessible at present without
lifting the stone on top of the barrel. (That is, the wine is secondary to
the stone, and the barrel is presently serving only the stone and not the
wine for all intents and purposes.) (M. Kornfeld)
QUESTION: Rava, on Yom Tov, told his servant to roast a goose and throw the
intestines to a cat. The Gemara learns from this that Rava rules in
accordance with Rebbi Shimon, who maintains that it is permitted to move
something on Yom Tov for the sake of animals even though it was designated
for human use before Yom Tov.
How can this be inferred from Rava's ruling? Perhaps Rava agrees with Rebbi
Yehudah and not with Rebbi Shimon; Rebbi Yehudah prohibits giving animals
an object designated for humans *only* when the object is *no longer fit*
to be used by a person. (Because the object is no longer fit for its
originally designated use, of feeding humans, it is considered Nolad and
Muktzah). But if the object can *still* be used by a person (that is, it is
fit for its designated use), then even Rebbi Yehudah agrees that it is not
Muktzah and it may be given to animals! Why, then, does the Gemara say that
Rava's action shows that he rules like Rebbi Shimon? The goose intestines
were still fit for humans!
(The type of Muktzah that our Sugya is discussing is usually referred to as
"Muchan l'Adam Eino Muchan l'Behemah." It is important to note that there
are two distinct types of Muktzah which are included in this expression.
(1) If the laws of Shabbos or Yom Tov prevent man from using an object --
for example, on Shabbos a live animal is not fit for human use since it is
forbidden to slaughter an animal on Shabbos. Even though live animals are
sometimes fed to dogs, since this animal is not fit for humans at present
it is Muktzah (according to Rebbi Shimon) and may not be fed to dogs.
In Rava's case, the intestines of the animal fit into neither category!
There is no law of Yom Tov preventing the intestines from being used by
man, and nothing happened to the intestines making them unfit for human
(2) If something happens to an object on Shabbos that makes it unfit for
man, it may not even be fed to dogs. (This is a form of Nolad). For
example, if the animal was alive before Yom Tov (and was fit for man, since
he could slaughter and eat it on Yom Tov) and then it died on Yom Tov,
becoming unfit for man.
(a) RASHI explains that goose intestines are not fit for man *not* because
any change occurred to them, but because it is Yom Tov, and it is not the
manner to eat goose intestines on Yom Tov. Therefore, it is considered as
if the laws of Yom Tov prohibit this item from human use (category (1)
above), and that it why it would be prohibited to give them to animals
according to Rebbi Yehudah.
(b) TOSFOS (Shabbos 29a, DH Achlan, and Beitzah 33a, DH v'Shadi) challenges
Rashi's explanation from the Gemara earlier (128a) which states that it is
permitted to move raw meat on Shabbos because it is possible for people to
eat the meat in such a state. Certainly it is not the normal manner to eat
raw meat on Shabbos, and yet it does not become Muktzah! Tosfos therefore
explains that goose intestines are edible as soon as the goose is
slaughtered (*before* Yom Tov), however, shortly thereafter (*on* Yom Tov)
the intestines spoil and become inedible. Since the intestines are no
longer fit for man, they become Muktzah according to Rebbi Yehudah. (Tosfos
understands that they fall into the second category (2) above.)
Perhaps Rashi maintained that goose intestines cannot be compared to the
raw meat for the following reason. Rava slaughtered the goose because he
intended to eat its meat, and the intestines are secondary to the meat.
Relative to the meat, the intestines are not fit for use on Yom Tov. Raw
meat, though, stands by itself and is not secondary to anything else, and
therefore it is not Muktzah. (M. Kornfeld)