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Shabbos 4


[1] OPINIONS: The Gemara tells us that in order to be obligated to bring a Chatas, a person must be unaware of the Isur that he did from the beginning until its end. Therefore, if one placed dough in an oven on Shabbos and remembers -- before the bread is baked -- that baking bread on Shabbos is prohibited, he is not obligated to bring a Chatas. What is the Halachah in a situation where the bread was placed in the oven on Shabbos, but only became baked after Shabbos?
(a) The AVNEI NEZER (OC #48-5; IGLEI TAL, Zorei'a #8) debated with Rav Yoav Yehoshua of Kintzk (the CHELKAS YOAV) what the Halachah would be if one puts bread in the oven on Shabbos and it becomes baked after Shabbos. The Avnei Nezer insisted that one is exempt, for it is not logical that the results of an action that occur after Shabbos should retroactively cause a person to have transgressed Shabbos. Otherwise, when a person lights a candle for a very sick person on Shabbos, immediately after Shabbos ends he should have to extinguish it so that it not continue to burn the fuel because of an action done on Shabbos for the sick person and retroactively cause his action of kindling a flame on Shabbos to be an Isur d'Oraisa (since the sick person no longer requires the Chilul Shabbos once Shabbos is over).

(b) The CHELKAS YOAV argued that one *is* liable when the bread becomes baked after Shabbos. His position is based on the logic of the NEMUKEI YOSEF (Bava Kama 22a, DH Esho Mishum Chetzav) who writes that a person is permitted to light candles before Shabbos even though they remain lit when Shabbos arrives, and it is not considered as though he is continuing to light them on Shabbos even though they are lit as a result of his action (i.e., Esho Mishum Chitzav). The reason, says the Nemukei Yosef, is because the original act of lighting the candle "contains" in it all the consequences of that act. Similarly, suggests the Chelkas Yoav, the original act of cooking *on Shabbos* contains within it even the cooking that occurs after Shabbos.

[2] This argument seems to revolve around whether the Melachah includes only the act of *placing food* on the fire, or whether the *baking process* is part of the actual Melachah. If it is part of the Melachah, the baking itself must also be done on Shabbos, and not just the act of placing the dough into the oven. If the baking process is only a condition that is stipulated in the Melachah (that is, one bakes on Shabbos is only liable if that condition is fufilled), then the person may be liable if the bread is baked (the condition fulfilled) even after Shabbos.

RASHI (DH Techilasah v'Sofah) states clearly that the transgression of baking is *not finished* until the bread is baked. This seems to support the hypothesis that the baking process is part of the Melachah, and the Avnei Nezer's ruling that the bread must be baked entirely on Shabbos. (Rav Hillel Ruvel)

The Avnei Nezer (in Iglei Tal) points out that one is liable for performing the Melachah of Zorei'a even before the plant grows (which occurs only long after the Melachah was done), while to be liable for performing the Melachah of cooking or baking, the food must be cooked right away in order for one to be liable.

Why is that so? Perhaps the answer lies in the fact that food is normally baked on the same day as it is placed in the oven, while food does not normally grow until long after it is planted. It is logical to assume that the Torah does not mean to leave a person hanging indefinitely until it will be determined whether he has transgressed a Melachah or not; after Shabbos is over it should already be clear that he has (or has not) done a Melachah.

QUESTION: In order for one to be liable to receive the death penalty for intentionally performing an Isur, one must have received unequivocal warning from witnesses ("By doing this act, you will transgress the Isur..."), that is, "Hasra'as Vadai." If the penalty for the transgression is not certain to come ("By doing this act, *you might possibly* transgress the Isur..."), the warning of the witnesses is called "Hasra'as Safek," which according to many opinions in the Gemara does not constitute Hasra'ah. One is not liable to be punished in Beis Din for such an act.

TOSFOS (DH Kodem) asks, how could anyone be liable for baking bread on Shabbos? At the time that he puts the dough into the oven, someone must warn him (give him Hasra'ah). However, the Hasra'ah will never be certain, because perhaps the bread will be removed before it is baked and he will not have transgressed the prohibition of baking with this action!

ANSWER: The category of "uncertain warning" ("Hasra'as Safek") only includes situations when the transgressor is warned against transgressing a prohibition which still requires that *another action be done* before the transgressor may be punished. In the case of baking, though, there is no other act for the baker to do; by leaving the dough *alone* he will have transgressed. Even though he may do an act to *avoid* being liable, this does not make the Hasra'ah into a Hasra'as Safek. (Tosfos, ibid.)

Tosfos adds that to be liable for baking, an additional condition is necessary. The person who puts the dough into the oven must *have in mind* to keep it there until it is baked. RAV AKIVA EIGER (Gilyon ha'Shas) asks why is this extra condition necessary; as long as it will become baked eventually, that should be sufficient, since no further action is required for the transgression. The Acharonim answer that the baking of the bread is an intrinsic part of the Melachah, and not merely a *condition* for transgressing the Melachah (see above, 1:[2]). The person who sins must have in mind to violate the transgression in its entirety. Normally, however, if the transgression is completed with the original misdeed, it is not necessary for the person to intend to fulfill the *conditions* that are related to the transgression.


QUESTION: The Gemara suggests that Akirah must be done from a place which has an area of at least four by four Tefachim, but Hanachah does not have to be done onto a place which has an area of four by four. What is the reason for this? This question is also relevant to the more basic question, what is the source for requiring an Akirah from a place of four by four Tefachim?

TOSFOS (DH v'Dilma) suggests two reasons for the requirement of 4x4:

(a) In the Mishkan, they would remove the objects used to build the Mishkan from their box and give them to the people who did the work. Since the box in which they were kept was probably four by four Tefachim, we may learn from what was done in the Mishkan that Akirah must always be from a place that is four by four Tefachim. When they handed the objects to the people doing the work, they did not place them on areas of four by four. Therefore, Hanachah does not need a place of four by four.

(b) The necessity for Akirah to be done from a place of four by four is derived from the verse, "A person shall not go out (read: bring out) *from his place* (Mim'komo)..." (Shemos 16:29). The Gemara in Eruvin (17b) says that this teaches that one may not bring something out *from his place* on Shabbos; "place" describes an area of significant size, or at least four by four Tefachim. The Torah does not specify any need for a significant "place" with regard to where the object is put down (Hanachah).

(c) The ME'IRI (4a, DH ha'Zorek) says that it is more logical to require a place of four by four for Akirah, because Akirah is the beginning of the execution of the Melachah.

(d) It could be that Hanachah does not require a place of four by four because of the concept of "Achshevei" -- by placing an object on a particular place, one gives that place importance (Eruvin 99a). This does not apply to Akirah, because when one *removes* an object from a certain place, he is not giving that place any importance. (This difference applies to the case in our Mishnah, and the case of Acherim on 5a, where one *intends* to place an object in a particular place. However, it will not explain why 4x4 is not necessary for a Hanachah in the case of "Kelutah," because one has no intention that the object rest where it is, in mid-air. This is why the Rishonim do not suggest that Achshevei explains why Hanachah does not need 4x4 Tefachim -- M. Kornfeld)

QUESTION: According to Rebbi Akiva, whenever an object passes through the air of Reshus ha'Rabim, it is considered as though it is resting ("Kelutah k'Mi sh'Hun'chah Dami"). The Rishonim ask, according to Rebbi Akiva how can anyone ever be liable for throwing something four Amos through the air of Reshus ha'Rabim, if it is considered resting at every point through which it travels?
(a) TOSFOS (5b, DH b'Shleima) answers that it is a Halachah l'Moshe mi'Sinai that "Kelutah k'Mi sh'Hun'chah Dami" does not take effect when an object is thrown four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim (as the Gemara says on 96b, that carrying or throwing an object four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim is learned from a Halachah l'Moshe mi'Sinai).

(b) The RAMBAN (5b) and TOSFOS YESHANIM (4b) explain that the concept of "Kelutah" is only said l'Chumra, to make a person liable, but not l'Kula, to exempt a person from transgressing.

(c) The RAMBAN (5b) and Rishonim offer another answer. The concept of "Kelutah" applies only after the object has entered into a new Reshus. Within the same Reshus, though (such as Reshus ha'Rabim), "Kelutah" does not apply.

QUESTION: The Gemara says that if someone throws an object from Reshus ha'Rabim onto the branch of a tree, the trunk of which is in Reshus ha'Yachid and the branch of which is in Reshus ha'Rabim, he is Chayav according to Rebbi. Rebbi maintains that although the branch is very small, we consider the branch to have an area of four by four Tefachim because it takes on the properties of the trunk which is four by four.

However, how could the person be Chayav for transferring four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim by throwing an object onto the branch? If the branch is within three Tefachim of the ground of Reshus ha'Rabim, then one does not need an area of four by four Tefachim to be obligated for Hanachah on the branch (Gemara, 100a). If it is higher than three Tefachim from the ground, the branch is not a Reshus ha'Rabim even if it is considered to have an area of four by four Tefachim -- if it is less than four by four, it is a Makom Petur, and if it is more than four by four, it is a Karmelis! If we give the branch the status of the tree, it is a Reshus ha'Yachid altogether. How, then, could the branch possibly be considered a Reshus ha'Rabim for one to be held liable for carrying four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim?


(a) TOSFOS (DH b'Ilan) gives an entirely different explanation for the Gemara. Tosfos explains that the Gemara does not mean that the branch is considered a Reshus ha'Rabim and one is Chayav for moving an object four Amos in Reshus ha'Rabim. Rather, the branch is a Reshus ha'Yachid; that is what the Gemara means when it says that the branch follows the properties of the trunk -- it is considered to be a Reshus ha'Yachid. Therefore, one is Chayav according to Rebbi for transferring from Reshus ha'Rabim to Reshus ha'Yachid, and not for transferring four Amos within Reshus ha'Rabim.

(b) RASHI (DH Zarak) does not explain that way. Rashi says that the branch is considered Reshus ha'Rabim. If so, how does Rashi answer our question? TOSFOS suggests that perhaps Rashi means that a person threw a sticky object that stuck to the side of the branch. Since it is stuck to the side of the branch and is hanging over Reshus ha'Rabim, it is considered to be resting in Reshus ha'Rabim (as we see in Rashi, 7a, DH Chayav). Nevertheless, if the branch to which the object is stuck is not four by four Tefachim, it will not be considered to be resting on an area of four by four since it is actually resting on the branch and not on the ground beneath it (as Rabeinu Tam explains on Daf 7b, Tosfos DH v'Tach).

(c) Perhaps Rashi is discussing a branch that is exactly nine Tefachim above the ground. Since people rest their objects on it (8a), it is considered a Reshus ha'Rabim. Tosfos did not suggest this obvious answer because he is of the opinion, as the Rashba explains on 8a, that anything that is nine Tefachim tall on which people rest their loads is considered significant *even if it is not four by four*. If Rebbi requires a surface of 4x4, he cannot be discussing a 9-Tefach tall branch. Nevertheless, Rashi maintains that even a nine-Tefach-high pedestal in Reshus ha'Rabim must be four by four Tefachim in order for something resting on it to be considered a Hanachah (as Rashi tells us on 92b, DH v'Iy Neima. See, however, Rashi on 8a, DH Mikatfei). (M. Kornfeld)

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