ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Sanhedrin 30
(a) It was strange that the Sh'tar that appeared in Beis-Din written in the
language of Beis-Din - had only two signatures, without a comment to the
effect that they had begun with three, but one of them had died.
1. Ravina nevertheless wanted to validate it - based on Resh Lakish's
Chazakah, that witnesses only sign on a Sh'tar that is above board (as we
(c) According to Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak, they could have got round the
problem - by inserting 'Bei Diyna' in the Sh'tar, making it clear that they
were indeed a Beis-Din of three.
2. Rav Nasan bar Ami, on the other hand, quoting Rava, objected - on the
grounds that in the case of such a blatant discrepancy, we suspect an error
on the part of Beis-Din.
(a) We query Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak's suggestion however, due to Shmuel -
who validates a Beis-Din of two (even though he calls them a 'Beis-Din
Chatzuf'). Consequently, whose to know that here too, they did not follow
Shmuel's opinion (which is not Halachah, see also Tosfos DH 've'Dilma').
(b) They could have obviated this problem too however by adding to
'Bei-Diyna - de'Rabana Ashi' (who are unlikely to have made such a mistake).
(c) And even if we suspect that they might have done - they could have
removed that suspicion too - by adding 've'Amar Lan Rabana Ashi' (who is
(a) In a case where someone tells the Yorshin how he saw their father hiding
money in a large box of sorts and declared that it belonged to so-and-so, or
was Ma'aser-Sheini money, the Beraisa draws a distinction between whether
the box was in a field - in which case he is believed, or in the house - in
which case he is not ...
(b) ... because - in the case of the field, he is believed since he has a
'Migu', (seeing as he could have taken the money from there himself and
given it to the person concerned [though it is not clear how the 'Migu' will
work with regard to Ma'aser Sheini), whereas in the house, to which he has
no access, he has no 'Migu' and is therefore not believed.
(c) In the same case, but where the sons themselves watched their father
hiding the money, and he left them similar instructions, it depends upon -
the manner in which he issued the instructions. If his tone of voice was
sincere, then they must follow his instructions, but if he conveyed the
impression that he was only trying to prevent them from taking the money in
his lifetime or that he was merely trying to hide the fact that he was a
wealthy man, then they may ignore the instructions and keep the money.
(d) And in a case where a person's deceased father appears to him in a dream
telling him where he will find a sum of money, adding that it belongs to
so-and-so or to Ma'aser Sheini, the Tana rules - 'Divrei Chalomos Lo Ma'alin
ve'Lo Moridin'. Consequently, should he find the money, he is permitted to
(a) According to Rebbi Yochanan, in the case in our Mishnah, where two
judges rule 'Zakai', and the third one 'Chayav', the Sofrim write 'P'loni
Zakai' (or 'Chayav', in the reverse case). According to Resh Lakish - they
write 'P'loni u'P'loni Mezakin' (or 'Mechayvin').
(b) We reject our initial interpretation of the Machlokes, whether, in the
event that they become obligated to pay, the third judge has to pay too
(Rebbi Yochanan) or not (Resh Lakish) on the grounds - that had it been up
to him, they would have ruled Chayav, so why should he be obligated to pay?
(a) So we establish the Machlokes concerning whether the two judges need to
pay the portion of the third judge (Rebbi Yochanan) or not (Resh Lakish). We
reject this suggestion too however, on the grounds - that without his
participation, there would have been no ruling, so why should they pay his
(b) We finally attribute Rebbi Yochanan to the La'av of "Lo Seilech Rachil
be'Amecha" (which renders it wrong to inform the litigants what the
individual judges ruled). Resh Lakish's holds - that to suggest that all
three judges declared the one party Zakai would be 'Mechzi ke'Shikra'
(appears false [and that overrides the consideration of the above La'av).
(c) In fact there is a third opinion. According to Rebbi Elazar, they write
'mi'Divreihen Nizdakeh P'loni' - in an effort to circumvent both "Lo Seilech
Rachil" and 'Mechzi ke'Shikra'.
(a) Our Mishnah states 'Gamru es ha'Davar, Machnisin Osan'. This refers -
either to the litigants or to the witnesses.
(b) Initially, we do not want to ascribe it to the litigants - because our
Mishnah has said nothing about sending them out in the first place.
(c) The Tana Kama of the Beraisa requires the two witnesses to view the
scene simultaneously. According to Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah - it does not
matter if they view it at different times (as we will explain shortly).
(d) The Tana Kama also requires them to testify together in Beis-Din,
whereas according to Rebbi Nasan - it does not matter if one testifies
today, the other, tomorrow.
(a) If we now establish 'Machnisin Osan' with regard to the witnesses, the
author of the Mishnah, which requires the two witnesses to appear in
Beis-Din simultaneously, will have to be - the Tana Kama of Rebbi Nasan.
(b) We counter this however, by establishing it with regard to the
litigants, and the author is Rebbi Nechemyah in a Beraisa, who cites the
custom of the refined people of Yerushalayim. They used to - send the
litigants (as well as the witnesses) out of the room whilst the Dayanim were
debating the issue, and call them back in before announcing their decision.
(c) We ask on this from a Beraisa which explicitly states 'Machnisin es
ha'Eidim' - and we concede that the author of this Beraisa is certainly the
Tana Kama of Rebbi Nasan.
(a) Assuming the Tana Kama and Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah argue over a
S'vara, the case must be - when one witness saw the loan of a Manah on a
certain day, and the other one saw the loan of a Manah on another day.
(b) Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah is not worried about combining two witnesses
testifying on different transactions - as long as they both testify that
Reuven owes Shimon a Manah.
(c) If on the other hand, their argument is based on the Pasuk "Lo Yakum Eid
Echad", then the Tana Kama will explain that the Torah ...
1. ...adds the word "Echad" - to teach us that wherever the word "Eid"
appears (without "Echad"), it means two witnesses.
(d) Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah counters this, by citing the continuation of
the Pasuk "O Ra'ah O Yada" - which implies 'mi'Kol Makom' (whatever the
circumstances), even if they witness it at two different times.
2. ... writes "Eid" and not "Eidim" - to teach us that, in our case, the
witnesses must view the transaction simultaneously (as if they were one).
(a) Similarly, the Tana Kama and Rebbi Nasan might argue over a S'vara or
K'ra. The Tana Kama's S'vara lies in the fact - that the testimony of a
single witness is eligible only to obligate the defendant to swear, but not
to establish a transaction.
(b) Rebbi Nasan counters this argument - by pointing out that even if the
witnesses were to arrive in Beis-Din simultaneously, they would only testify
one after the other, so what is the point of making them arrive together?
(c) The Pasuk they argue over is the continuation of the same Pasuk in
Vayikra "Im Lo Yagid ve'Nasa Avono", and the basis of their Machlokes is -
whether we learn 'Hagadah' (the actual testimonial) from 'Re'iyah'
(witnessing the event [the Tana Kama]) or not (Rebbi Nasan).
(d) With regard to the previous Machlokes, both Tana'im must hold - like the
Tana Kama of Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah.
(a) Rebbi Shimon ben Elyakim was trying hard - to give Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi
Chanina Semichah (but without success).
(b) He eventually got Rebbi Yochanan to do the trick - by telling him that
Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina had the information (whether the Halachah was
like Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah or not) that he (Rebbi Yochanan) was looking
(c) Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina actually told Rebbi Yochanan that he had
heard - how Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah agreed with Rebbi Nasan (that even
the actual testimony may be delivered at different times).
(d) Rebbi Yochanan was not impressed however - because if Rebbi Yehoshua ben
Korchah did not require the two witnesses to *view* their testimony
simultaneously, he pointed out, then it is obvious that they do not need to
*present* it simultaneously (see Rabeinu Chananel).
(a) Rebbi Zeira extrapolated from the fact that Rebbi Yochanan did not
withdraw the Semichah - that once someone who is fit to receive Semichah
does in fact receive it, the Semichah stands (see Hagahos Maharshal).
(b) Rebbi Chiya bar Avin Amar Rav rules like Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah both
by Karka'os and by Metaltelin. The case by ...
1. ... Karka'os is - when the two witnesses testify that a certain piece of
land belongs to so-and-so.
(c) Ula rules like Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah - only by Karka, but not by
2. ... Metaltelin - when they testify that Reuven admitted that certain
Metaltelin belongs to Shimon.
(d) We reconcile Ula's statement (implying that the Rabbanan argue with
Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah even by Karka'os), with Rebbi Aba Amar Rav Huna
Amar Rav and others, who maintain restrict the Rabbanan's opinion to
Metaltelin - by applying the principle 'Gavra a'Gavra ka'Ramis' (how can one
ask from one Amora on another (i.e. Ula argues with Rebbi Aba Amar Rav Huna
(a) 'Tani Rav Idi bar Avin be'Nizakin de'Bei Karna' (one of those who agree
with Rebbi Aba Amar Rav Huna Amar Rav), adds that the Rabbanan also concede
to Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah by Eidus Bechor, Eidus Chazakah and she'be'Ben
ve'she'be'Bas. 'she'be'Ben ve'she'be'Bas' refers to the two hairs that a
Katan requires to become a Gadol. In this context ...
1. ... 'Eidus Bechor' is - when one witness testifies that the Bechor
brought in by the Kohen sustained one of its two blemishes automatically,
and the other witness said the same about the other blemish.
(b) 'Eidus Bechor' cannot be speaking when each witness testified
independently that a Chacham permitted the Bechor - because, based on the
principle 'Eid Echad Ne'eman be'Isurin', even one witness would be believed
in such a case, and what's more, even the Kohen himself, because of the
principle that a person will not lie with regard to something that stands to
2. ... 'Eidus Chazakah' - when one witness testifies that the Machzik ate
the fruit of the field for the first three years of the Sh'mitah cycle, and
the other, that he ate the fruit for the second three years.
(c) Even though the Rabbanan agree in these three cases, they argue in our
case (of a loan of a Manah) - because by the latter, each witness is
testifying on a different Manah, as we explained earlier.
(d) In the case of she'be'Ben ve'she'be'Bas, Tani Rav Idi bar Avin cannot be
speaking when one witness testifies that he saw a hair on the back of the
child's hand (or on the lower back), and the second witness, on his
stomach - because seeing as one hair is not a sign of Gadlus, that would
constitute not only Chatzi *Eidus*, but Chatzi *Davar* as well.
(e) The case must therefore be - when each witness testifies that he saw two
hairs in their respective places.
(a) The Rabbanan who came from Mechuza quoting Rebbi Zeira in the name of
Rav rule like Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah by Karka, but not by Metaltelin.
Rav is merely following his own reasoning, Ula declares, since Rav already
1. ... 'Hoda'ah Achar Hoda'ah or Hoda'ah Achar Halva'ah - Mitztarfi' (the
two witnesses combine).
(b) The reason for the difference between the two sets of cases is - that
whereas the former might well pertain to the same loan, the latter
2. ... 'Halva'ah Achar Halva'ah or Halva'ah Achar Hoda'ah - Lo Mitztarfi'.
(c) Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak asked Rav Huna B'rei de'Rav Yehoshua ...
1. ... initially - that perhaps Hoda'ah Achar Hoda'ah also pertains to two
separate loans, seeing as no-one informed the witnesses to the contrary.
2. ... that, even if the debtor did inform the second witness that he is
admitting to the same Manah as he admitted to the first - how does the first
witness know that he and the second witness are testifying on the same
(a) Rav Huna B'rei de'Rav Yehoshua resolved the problem - by requiring the
debtor to inform the first witness that the Manah that he is about to admit
in the presence of the second witness is the same one that he admitted in
(b) When Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak thanked him for putting his mind at rest -
he cited Rava (or Rav Sheishes) who placed a spoke in the wheel, inasmuch as
if that was the case, Hoda'ah Achar Hoda'ah would be synonymous with Hoda'ah
Achar Halva'ah (which must also speak in the same circumstances), so why did
Rav need to mention it?
(c) When Rav Nachman bar Yitzchak told Rav Huna B'rei de'Rav Yehoshua that
he now understood why he had heard him described as someone who bends
date-palms and straightens them again, he meant - that he apparently had the
strange habit of bringing proofs and then refuting them.
(d) The Neherda'i combine the witnesses in all four of the above cases -
because they rule like Rebbi Yehoshua ben Korchah, who combines the
witnesses even by Metaltelin.
(a) With regard to Eidus Mamon, Rav Yehudah validates the testimony of two
witnesses who contradict each other in the Bedikos - details concerning the
case, but which are not connected to the time or the place, which might
therefore cause the witnesses to become Zomemin.
(b) Rava restricts Rav Yehudah's ruling to where one of the witnesses refers
to a black purse, and the other, a white one - to preclude where one witness
refers to a black Manah, and the other, a white Manah (which concerns the
(c) Rav Chisda maintains that although a discrepancy in the type of weapon
used by the murderer does not fall under the category of "Nachon ha'Davar"
prescribed by the Torah in Re'ei, a discrepancy in the color clothes that he
or the murdered man wore, does.
(d) Certainly, Rava (explaining Rav Yehudah) just explained that a
discrepancy in Bedikos is only acceptable by cases of Mamon, and not by
cases of Nefashos - but Rav Chisda disagrees ('Gavra a'Gavra ka'Ramis')?