REVIEW QUESTIONS ON GEMARA AND RASHI
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Nedarim 86
(a) We just queried Rav Huna B'rei de'Rav Yehoshua's explanation (that our
Mishnah speaks when the woman declared her hands forbidden after her husband
divorced her), he reason for this Halachah on the grounds that, seeing as
she was unable to do so immediately, why is it not still considered a 'Davar
she'Lo Ba le'Olam? Rav Ila now attempts to compare the case to someone who
declares the field that he is about to sell to his friend Hekdesh for when
he has bought it back (which he takes for granted, takes effect).
he consider our case comparable to his, seeing as in our case, the woman
cannot forbid her work immediately?
(b) On what grounds does Rebbi Yirmiyah refute Rav Ila's explanation?
(c) So he compares our case to the very case that Rav Ila declined to
compare it to (where the 'owner' declares a field that he has already sold,
Hekdesh). Rav Papa however, rejects this on the same grounds as Rav Ila did.
He in turn, compares it to someone who declares the field that he gave as
collateral against a loan for after he has redeemed it.
Why does the field
only become Hekdesh after the borrower has redeemed it? Why does Hekdesh not
override the Shibud?
(d) In that case, how can we ask in Erchin how it is possible for the renter
to live in his rented house once the owner has declared it Hekdesh.
we not say there too, that Hekdesh Damim cannot override the Shibud of the
(a) How does Rav Shisha B'rei de'Rav Idi reject the proof from the previous
case that the woman too, should be able to declare her hands Hekdesh after
Answers to questions
(b) Why is that? Why is it not nevertheless possible for the woman to make
her Neder effective immediately, by saying 'Eini Nizones ve'Eini Osah', like
(c) So to which similar case of Mashkon does Rav Shisha now compare our
case, to prove that she can declare her hands Hekdesh for after she becomes
(d) And on what grounds does Rav Ashi reject his explanation?
(a) Rav Ashi finally offers a new line of approach, to explain the
difference between Hekdesh and Konamos.
What makes Konamos different? Why
does Shmuel rule like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri (who says 'Yafer, Shema
Yigreshenah'), despite the fact that he holds 'Ein Adam Makdish Davar she'Lo
(b) How does Rav Ashi know this? Which aspect of Konamos renders them
similar to Kedushas Mizbei'ach, rather than to Kedushas Damim?
(c) Rava holds that Hekdesh, Chametz and Shichrur remove the Shibud.
does he mean by ...
- ... Hekdesh?
- ... Chametz?
- ... Shichrur?
(a) According to Rav Ashi's explanation, why does the Tana of our Mishnah
say 'Shema Yigreshenah'? Why does the Neder not take effect immediately?
(b) In that case, how do we resolve our original problem of 'Adam Makdish
Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam' (where Shmuel appears to contradict himself)?
(a) What will be the Din if a man annuls a Neder thinking it was his wife
who declared it, and it turned out to be his daughter or vice-versa?
(b) The same applies if he annuls her Neder of Nezirus thinking she declared
an ordinary Neder, or vice-versa, or if he annulled her Neder thinking that
she forbade figs, when really it was grapes, or vice-versa.
Will the same
apply if he upholds her Neder under the same circumstances?
(c) What is the reason for this Halachah?
(a) How do we learn this principle from the Pasuk "Yani Osah"?
Answers to questions
(b) But this Pasuk is written by Hafarah.
What is the source of the same
principle by Hakamah?
(c) In view of the Hekesh "Iyshah Yekimenu, ve'Iyshah Yeferenu", what can we
learn from the Beraisa in Na'arah ha'Me'urasah 'Chomer be'Hekem mi'be'Hafer,
Kiyem be'Libo, Kiyam ... '?
(d) What other Halachah can we learn from the word "Ki Hecherish *Lah*"?