THOUGHTS ON THE DAILY DAF
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MENACHOS 5 - anonymously dedicated by an Ohev Torah and Marbitz Torah in
Baltimore, Maryland, formerly of Ramat Beit Shemesh, Israel.
1) OFFERING A DIFFERENT "KORBAN MINCHAH" BEFORE THE "MINCHAS HA'OMER"
QUESTION: The Gemara quotes Reish Lakish who says that when the Kemitzah of
a Minchas ha'Omer is performed she'Lo Lishmah (not with intent that it is a
Minchas ha'Omer), the Korban Minchah nevertheless is valid and may be
offered, but it does not accomplish the permitting of the Isur Chadash on
all newly harvested grain, and thus another Minchas ha'Omer must be offered.
The Gemara asks how can Reish Lakish permit eating the Shirayim of the
Minchas ha'Omer that was offered she'Lo Lishmah, if, when it was offered, it
did not serve to permit Chadash? At the time that it was offered, its flour
was Asur, and thus it should not be a valid Korban altogether! We know that
the Minchas ha'Omer must be brought from grain that a person is permitted to
eat, as is derived from the verse in Yechezkel (45:15). How, then, can it be
offered as a valid Minchah?
The KEREN ORAH asks why the Gemara does not ask a more obvious question on
the ruling of Reish Lakish. The Mishnah later (68b, and cited on 5b) states
that any Korban Minchah that is brought before the Minchas ha'Omer is
brought is invalid. The Gemara should have asked how can Reish Lakish rule
that the first Minchah (for which the Kemitzah was done she'Lo Lishmah) is
valid, if it is being offered before the actual Minchas ha'Omer. Why does
the Gemara not question Reish Lakish's statement from an explicit Mishnah,
instead of asking a question from a statement of another Amora?
ANSWER: The BRISKER RAV (cited by the MINCHAS AVRAHAM) answers that the
reason for the Halachah of the Mishnah later is *not* because of the verse
in Yechezkel that requires the Minchah to be brought from grain that is
permitted to a Yisrael to eat, but rather it is based on an entirely
different source which is not relevant to Reish Lakish's ruling.
We know that the Matir (the permitting factor) that permits new grain for
ordinary consumption is the Minchas ha'Omer, and the Matir that permits new
grain for being offered as Menachos is the Shtei ha'Lechem. The Brisker Rav
proves that the Omer is also necessary as a Matir for grain to be offered as
Menachos. The Torah calls the Omer the "first" Minchah (Vayikra 23:10),
which necessarily implies that any other Minchah that is brought before the
Omer is Pasul, because any other Minchah is not permitted to be the "first."
This is the reason why the Mishnah later says that any Minchah that is
brought before the Omer is Pasul; it is not because that Minchah is not
permitted to a Yisrael to eat, but rather it is because that Minchah is
being brought first, before the Omer.
This novel understanding of the Mishnah answers the question of the Keren
Orah. The Gemara could not have questioned Reish Lakish's ruling from the
Mishnah later that says any Minchah brought before the Omer is Pasul,
because that Mishnah is not relevant to Reish Lakish's case. The Gemara here
is discussing an Omer which was offered she'Lo Lishmah, but which
nevertheless retains its title as a Korban Minchas ha'Omer (as is evident
from the fact that it is forbidden for the Kohen to continue performing the
Avodos of this offering she'Lo Lishmah -- "Asur l'Shenuyei" (2a)). As long
as this offering retains its title of a Minchas ha'Omer, the law that it
must be the *first* Minchah to be offered does not change. Therefore, it
cannot be Pasul because of the Halachah of the Mishnah later which says that
any Minchah brought before the Omer is Pasul; this offering *is* the Omer
with regard to having to be offered first.
The Gemara therefore questions Reish Lakish only from the Halachah that the
verse in Yechezkel requires that the Minchas ha'Omer be fit for ordinary
consumption. Since, in the case of Reish Lakish, the Isur Chadash has not
yet been permitted, the Minchah is prohibited to be eaten and thus it should
be Pasul. (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)
2) THE PROOF THAT REISH LAKISH MAINTAINS "HE'IR HA'MIZRACH MATIR"
QUESTION: The Gemara quotes the Mishnah later (68b) that states that if a
Korban Minchah is brought from the new harvest before the Minchas ha'Omer is
brought, then it is Pasul. Rebbi Yitzchak says in the name of Reish Lakish
that the Korban Minchah is Pasul only when it is brought on the fourteenth
or fifteenth of Nisan. If it is brought before the Omer on the sixteenth of
Nisan, then it is valid b'Di'eved. The Gemara proves from this statement
that Reish Lakish maintains that the "He'ir ha'Mizrach" -- the coming of
dawn of the sixteenth of Nisan -- is the Matir which permits the new grain,
and it is not the actual Omer offering that permits it. Therefore, a Korban
Minchah that is offered on the sixteenth of Nisan before the Omer is valid,
since it is no longer subject to the Isur of Chadash.
The SHITAH MEKUBETZES questions the Gemara's proof that Reish Lakish
maintains that "He'ir ha'Mizrach" permits Chadash. Perhaps the new grain
remains Asur until the Minchas ha'Omer is offered, and the reason why a
Korban Minchah brought before the Minchas ha'Omer on the sixteenth of Nisan
is valid is because Reish Lakish holds that "Ein Mechusar Zeman l'Vo
va'Yom." The Gemara earlier (5a) uses this logic to explain why a Korban
Omer that is offered she'Lo Lishmah is valid, even though the Isur of
Chadash is not removed. This logic dictates that since on this day Chadash
will become Mutar, it is considered to be Mutar already from the beginning
of the day. Perhaps here, too, Reish Lakish maintains that the reason the
Minchah brought before the Omer is valid is because the Omer will eventually
be brought on this day and permit Chadash!
ANSWER: It is clear that the question of the Shitah Mekubetzes is based on
the understanding that the purpose of the Omer offering is to remove the
Isur of Chadash. Accordingly, since the day is not considered "Mechusar
Zeman," on the day that the Omer is brought, the Isur Chadash is considered
to have been removed from the beginning of the day.
However, the BRISKER RAV proposes that the purpose of the Omer is not merely
to remove the Isur of Chadash to permit the new grain for ordinary
consumption. As we discussed in the previous Insight, the Brisker Rav
proposes that the Omer is also necessary in order to permit Menachos brought
from the new grain to be offered. Accordingly, the Omer must be the first
Minchah offering that is brought.
According to this logic, the question of the Shitah Mekubetzes is no longer
applicable. If there is an order of precedence to which we must adhere when
bringing Minchah offerings, then the logic of "Ein Mechusar Zeman l'Vo
va'Yom" does not help. The Omer *must* be brought first, and only afterwards
may other Menachos be brought. The Menachos must be brought according to
this order. When the Omer is offered after another Minchah, the logic of
"Ein Mechusar Zeman" cannot change the actual order and make it as if the
Omer was offered before the Minchah that was actually offered first. Only in
the previous Sugya (5a), where the question was whether or not the Minchah
is considered permitted for ordinary consumption, does the logic of "Ein
Mechusar Zeman" apply and tell us that sine later on in the day it will
become Mutar, it is considered Mutar now with regard to being a valid Korban
Minchah. The Gemara here, though, is discussing a specific order, and thus
the logic of "Ein Mechusar Zeman" does not apply. Consequently, the fact
that Reish Lakish validates a Minchah brought before the Omer proves that he
maintains that Chadash becomes Mutar at "He'ir ha'Mizrach." (See MINCHAS
AVRAHAM, p. 48.) (Mordechai Zvi Dicker)