ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Makos 5
(a) When our Mishnah rules ...
1. ... 'Meshalshin be'Mamon', it means - that the Eidim Zomemin divide
between them the money that they owe the defendant against whom they
(b) Abaye learns the latter Din from a 'Gezeirah-Shavah' "Rasha" "Rasha"
from Chayvei Miysah. Rava however, learns it from a S'vara - because
otherwise, they would not be conforming with the Torah's requirement of
2. ... 'Ein Meshalshin be'Makos', it means - that each one receives the full
quota of Malkos.
(c) The same S'vara does not apply to Mamon - because whereas Malkos is not
called Malkos unless the Nadun receives the full amount of lashes, Mamon is
called Mamon even if they divide it, since Mamon depends on the recipient.
(a) Our Mishnah states 'Ein ha'Eidim Na'asin Zomemin ad she'Yazimu es
Atzman' - to preclude a case where the second pair of witnesses claim that
the murderer or the victim was with them at the time.
(b) According to the Tana Kama, irrespective of how many pairs of witnesses
Reuven and Shimon declare Zomemin, they are believed, and (in a case of
Chiyuv Misah) all the pairs are put to death. Rebbi Yehudah however, rules
that this is a put-up job, and we cannot believe them, except to kill the
(c) Rav Ada (or Rabah or Rava) learns from the Pasuk "ve'Hinei Eid Sheker
ha'Eid, Sheker Anah be'Achiv" - that the witnesses are only Zomemin if the
second witnesses prove them false by testifying against them personally.
(d) de'Bei Rebbi Yishmael learns it from the Pasuk "Ki Yakum Eid Chamas
be'Ish La'anos Bo Sarah" - which he interprets to mean that the testimony
must be directly removed (meaning the witnesses).
(a) Rava draws a distinction, in a case where Reuven and Shimon testified
that Levi killed Yehudah ...
1. ... on the east side of the palace, and Yisachar and Zevulun claim that
Reuven and Shimon were with them on the west side of the palace at that
time - between where it is possible to see from the west to the east (in
which case they will not be Zomemin), and where it is not (in which case
(b) The reason that ...
2. ... on Sunday morning in Sura, and Yisachar and Zevulun testify that
Reuven and Shimon were with them in Neherda'a on Sunday evening - between
where it is possible to get from Sura to Neherda'a (in which case they will
not be Zomemin), and where it (in which case, they will).
1. ... the first case is not obvious is - because one might have thought
that even if most people cannot see from one side of the palace grounds to
the other, perhaps we ought to take into consideration the possibility that
Reuven and Shimon's eyesight is particularly good, and not declare them
2. ... the second case is not obvious is - because, by the same token, even
if it is not possible to travel from Sura to Neherda'a in one day, perhaps
Reuven and Shimon made it by means of a particularly fast racing camel.
Note, that presumably, both of these suppositions are based on the Pasuk
"ve'Hitzilu ha'Eidah" (the obligation to try and save a fellow-Jew from the
(a) Rava rules in a case where Reuven and Shimon testify that Levi killed
Yehudah, and Yisachar and Zevulun then render them Zomemin, adding that Levi
did indeed kill Yehudah but 1. on Tuesday, or even 2. on the Friday before,
that the first pair are Chayav Misah. We might have thought otherwise ...
1. ... in the first case - because Reuven and Shimon were testifying against
a man who had really murderer, and who was therefore Chayav Misah anyway.
(b) They are nevertheless Chayav Misah - because a murderer is not
considered Chayav Misah until Beis-Din pronounce that he is (not even
retroactively after they declare him Chayav).
2. ... in the second case (even after knowing the first ruling) - because in
this case, he had even murdered prior to the date that they gave, which
certainly ought to exempt them from being sentenced to death.
(c) We ask from the Mishnah later, which expressly declares Reuven and
Shimon Chayav Misah, even though Levi is found to be Chayav too (so what is
Rava's Chidush?). And we answer - that Rava's Chidush lies in his second
statement, which exempts Reuven and Shimon from the death-penalty should
their testimony have taken place after Levi had already been sentenced (in
another Beis-Din, only the current Beis-Din were unaware of the sentence).
(a) Rava rules in the Seifa that in a case where Reuven and Shimon testified
on Thursday that Levi was sentenced to death for the murder of Yehudah on
Monday, and Yisachar and Zevulun, after testifying 'Imanu Heyisem', add that
he was sentenced on Tuesday, Reuven and Shimon are Patur (despite the fact
that when Reuven and Shimon claimed that Levi had murdered Yehudah, the
murder had not yet taken place) ...
(b) ... because when Reuven testified, Levi had already been sentenced to
death, and witnesses cannot became Chayav Misah for testifying against a
(c) In a case where Reuven and Shimon testify on Thursday that Levi ...
1. ... borrowed a hundred Zuz from Shimon on Monday, and Yisachar and
Zevulun, after testifying 'Imanu Heyisem', add that he borrowed the money on
Tuesday - Reuven and Shimon are Patur (because a debtor is obligated to pay
from the moment that he borrows, irrespective of whether Beis-Din have
obligated him to pay or not).
(d) ... because, unlike Mamon - K'nas only becomes Chayav when Beis-Din
obligate him to pay. Proof of this is the principle 'Modeh bi'Kenas, Patur'
('Someone who admits to a K'nas is Patur'). Consequently, K'nas is
equivalent to Chiyuv Misah in this regard.
2. ... stole a sheep, and Shechted or sold it on Monday, and Yisachar and
Zevulun, after testifying 'Imanu Heyisem', add that he stole it ... on
Tuesday or even on the Friday before - Reuven and Shimon are Chayav ...
(a) We ask that if, as Rebbi Yehudah in our Mishnah claims, 'Istatis Hi Zu',
why do we sentence the first pair of witnesses to death on their testimony.
We reject Rebbi Avahu's answer (that the Tana speaks when they were already
put to death) on the grounds - that if the Din has already been carried out,
what is the point of the Mishnah mentioning it?
(b) Rava therefore explains Rebbi Yehudah's statement - to mean that if
there is only one pair of witnesses (whom the Mazimin declare to be
Zomemin), then they are sentenced to death, but not if there are more.
(c) The Kashya we ask (and remain with) on Rava from Rebbi Yehudah's Lashon
is - the addition of the word ('Ein Nehereges Ela Kat Rishonah) 'Bilevad',
which doesn't really make much sense according to Rava's interpretation.
(a) In a case where a woman brought two pairs of witnesses who were found to
be Zomemin, and she produced a third pair, Resh Lakish ruled - that the
woman has a Chazakah for hiring false witnesses, and the third pair was not
(b) Rebbi Elazar objected to Resh Lakish's ruling's however, on the
grounds - that even if the woman has a Chazakah, the third pair of witnesses
don't (so how can we invalidate them?)
(c) When the same thing happened with Resh Lakish, only in the presence of
Rebbi Yochanan, who presented the same argument as Rebbi Elazar, Resh Lakish
became angry with Rebbi Elazar - whom, he suspected, had received his ruling
from Rebbi Yochanan, but that he had failed to say so.
(d) After suggesting that Resh Lakish holds like Rebbi Yehudah and Rebbi
Yochanan, like the Rabbanan, we reconcile ...
1. ... Resh Lakish with the Rabbanan, inasmuch as even they will agree with
Rebbi Yehudah in this case, invalidating the witnesses - seeing as the woman
was looking for false witnesses, even going so far as to pay them for their
services (whereas in the case in our Mishnah, the second pair of witnesses
were acting on their own volition.
2. ... Rebbi Yochanan with Rebbi Yehudah, inasmuch as even Rebbi Yehudah may
well agree with the Rabbanan in this case - because Rebbi Yehudah only said
his Din there, where it is simply not feasible that the whole world happened
to have been with the second pair of witnesses wherever they were; whereas
here, it is perfectly feasible to say that the earlier pairs of witnesses
did not know the testimony, whilst the last pair did.
(a) The Chachamim obligate the Eidim Zomemin only if they became Zomemin
after the Din against the litigant whom they obligated was concluded. The
Tzedokim however, rule - that they are sentenced to death even if they
became Zomemin after the Din was executed.
(b) The Tzedokim based their ruling on the Pasuk "Nefesh Tachas Nafesh", the
source of the Rabbanan's ruling is the Pasuk - "Ka'asher Zamam La'asos
le'Achiv" ('only as long as his brother is alive (because after his death he
is no longer considered a brother).
(c) The Rabbanan then learn from "Nefesh be'Nafesh" - that they are Chayav
only after the G'mar-Din (the final ruling has been issued), but not before.
(d) When b'Rivi's father asked him that if the Eidim Zomemin are Chayav
before the Din has been carried out (for "Ka'asher Zamam"), how much more so
afterwards, he replied with the principle that he himself had taught him -
'Ein Onshin min ha'Din' (that one cannot punish on the basis of a 'Kal
(a) Despite the fact that the Torah writes "Ish Asher Yikach es Achoso bas
Aviv O Bas Imo", it needs to add "Ervas Achoso Gilah" - to teach us that the
punishment of Kareis extends to a sister who is both paternal and maternal.
(b) We cannot learn this from a 'Kal va'Chomer' from "bas Aviv O bas Imo" -
because of the principle (which the Torah is teaching us here) 'Ein Onshin
(c) And having written "Ervas Achoscha bas Avicha O bas Imecha ... (the
Azharah)", the Torah nevertheless needs to add "Ervas bas Eishes Avicha
Moledes Avicha" - because of the principle (which the Torah is teaching us
here, too) 'Ein Mazhirin min ha'Din'.
(a) In connection with the Din in our Mishnah ('Ein ha'Eidim Zomemin
Neheragin ad she'Yigamer ha'Din'), we learn from the 'Gezeirah-Shavah' ...
1. ... "Rasha (by Malkos)" "Rasha" (by Misah) - that the same principle
applies to Chayvei Malkos.
(b) In spite of the fact that the witnesses in the latter case also receive
Malkos (as we learned above), we cannot learn it from the previous case of
Chayvei Malkos - since their Din is not derived from "Ka'asher Zamam" (as we
learned there too).
2. ... "Rotze'ach (be'Shogeg)" "Rotze'ach" - that it applies to Chayvei
(c) When Rebbi Yehudah ben Tabai related how he killed an Eid Zomem after
the G'mar Din but before the defendant had been put to death, to preclude
the opinion of the Tzedokim, the Chachamim informed him - that he had
spilled innocent blood, since we have learned (in the next Mishnah) that
only both witnesses can become Zomemin, and not just one of them.
(d) Rebbi Yehudah ben Tabai's dual reaction to the Chachamim's reprimand was
1. ... to undertake from that time on - never to issue a ruling unless he
was in the presence of Rebbi Shimon ben Shetach.
2. ... to atone for his mistake - by regularly visiting the grave of the
witness whom he had sentenced to death and begging his forgiveness.
(a) Everyone believed the voice that they heard to be that of the Eid Zomem.
Rebbi Yehudah ben Tabai tried to prove that it must have been his voice - on
the basis that, following his own death, the voice would stop.
(b) Rav Acha b'Rei de'Rava refuted his proof however - because he could have
either been taking Rebbi Yehudah ben Tabai to a Din Torah or he was coming
to terms with him (either of which would also explain why his voice was no
longer heard after Rebbi Yehudah ben Tabai's death).
(a) The problem our Mishnah has with the Pasuk 'al-Pi Shenayim Eidim O
Sheloshah Eidim Yumas ha'Meis" is - why the Torah needs to add "O Sheloshah
Eidim"? If two witnesses are valid, then three certainly are?
(b) The Tana Kama resolves it - by comparing two witnesses to three,
inasmuch as just as three witnesses can render two, Zomemin, so too, can two
render three, Zomemin.
(c) And from the word "Eidim" he learns - that they can even render a
hundred witnesses Zomemin (because of the principle 'T'rei ke'Me'ah' [two
witnesses are just as good as a hundred']).
(d) Rebbi Shimon learns from this Pasuk that three, and even a hundred
witnesses, do not become Zomemin unless all of them are, just like the Din
is by two. Even though the Torah writes "ve'Hinei Eid Sheker ha'Eid" (in the
singular), we know that both witnesses must be Zomemin - because, as we have
learned in Sotah, whenever the Torah writes S'tam "Eid", it means a pair of
(a) According to Rebbi Akiva, the third witness comes (not to be lenient,
like Rebbi Shimon, but) to be strict. And he goes on to explain that - even
though the third witness is superfluous, he is subject to the same
punishment as the first two, should they turn out to be Zomemin.
(b) And if that is true of someone who joins a group of sinners, he
continues - how much more so will it be true of someone who joins a group of
people who are performing a Mitzvah.
(c) The source of this 'Kal va'Chomer' is - the principle that 'Midah Tovah
Merubah mi'Midas Pur'anus'.
(d) The second Chumra that he learn from the comparison of three witnesses
to two is - that if one of the witnesses is found to be Pasul, then he
disqualifies the entire testimony, even if he is the third witness, and
there are two witnesses without him.
(a) Rebbi Yossi qualifies the previous ruling - by restricting it to Dinei
Nefashos (where the Torah writes "ve'Hitzilu ha'Eidah" [to save the
defendant from the death-sentence]), but not to Dinei Mamonos (see also
Tosfos DH 'Amar').
(b) Rebbi agrees with Rebbi Akiva - but only if the third witness was party
to the warning. Otherwise ...
(c) ... whenever two brothers witness a murder, they would immediately
disqualify all witnesses who saw it too.