ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Kidushin 5
KIDUSHIN 2-5 - sponsored by a generous grant from an anonymous donor. Kollel Iyun Hadaf is indebted to him for his encouragement and support and prays that Hashem will repay him in kind.
(a) We try to learn Kidushei Sh'tar from a 'Kal va'Chomer' from Kidushei
Kesef - if Kesef, which does not take a woman out of her husband's domain,
yet it does bring her in, then a Sh'tar, which takes her out, should
certainly take her in.
(b) We refute this 'Kal va'Chomer' however, on the grounds that Kesef has an
advantage over Sh'tar in another area - inasmuch as redeems Hekdesh and
Ma'aser Sheini (which a Sh'tar cannot do).
(c) So we learn Kidushei Sh'tar from the Hekesh - "ve'Yatz'ah ve'Haysah",
comparing Kidushin to Gitin, where the Torah specifically writes "ve'Kasav
Lah Sefer K'riysus".
(a) Abaye refutes the suggestion that we ought to learn from the same Hekesh
that a man can divorce his wife with money by virtue of the principle 'Ein
Kateigor Na'aseh Saneigor' - by which he means that it would not be
appropriate to separate a couple using the same coinage which served to
bring them together.
(b) We cannot use the same principle to refute the previous D'rashah (that
permits Kidushei Kesef from "Ve'Yatz'ah ve'Haysah") - because, unlike the
coinage used for the two transactions (which is exactly the same) the
wording in the one documents differs from the wording in the other.
(a) Rava disagrees with Abaye. He learns from the Pasuk "*ve'Kasav Lah*
Sefer K'riysus" - (what Abaye learned from the S'vara of 'Ein Kateigor ...
') 'bi'Kesivah Misgareshes, ve'Einah Misgareshes be'Kesef'.
(b) We choose not to switch the D'rashos, to Darshen 'bi'Kesivah
Misgareshes, ve'Einah Miskadeshes bi'Kesivah', and learn from the Hekesh of
"ve'Yatz'ah ve'Haysah" that one can divorce with money - because it is
logical to confine the D'rashah of "ve'Kasav Lah" to Gitin (where it is
(c) Rebbi Yossi Hagelili learns from "ve'Kasav Lah" that one can write a Get
on anything. That a man cannot divorce his wife with Kesef - he learns from
"Sefer K'riysus", 'Sefer Korsah, ve'Ein Davar Acher Korsah'.
(a) The Rabbanan learn from "Sefer K'riysus" - that the separation must be
complete (that the ex-husband cannot make stipulations that force her to do
his bidding after the divorce [effectively binding her to him]).
(b) This does not incorporate a case where the husband gives his wife a Get
with the stipulation that she is forbidden to drink wine or visit her
father's house for thirty days - because in thirty days time, the condition
will no longer apply and the K'riysus will be complete.
(c) Rebbi Yossi Hagelili learns this Din from - "Kareis - K'riysus"
(implying two D'rashos).
(d) The Rabbanan argue with Rebbi Yossi Hagelili on the grounds - that they
do consider "K'riysus" to be two D'rashos.
(a) We then attempt to learn one of the three means of acquiring a woman
from the other two (not just because we have two others, but ) - based on
the 'Kal va'Chomer' that we cited earlier by each case, before discrediting
it with a Pircha. We are now trying to overcome these Pirchos, by using the
other two to overrule it.
(b) We cannot learn ...
1. ... Sh'tar from Kesef and Bi'ah - because unlike them, it does not
benefit the woman in any way (since the Sh'tar does not even need to be
worth a P'rutah, and it only contains the wording of the Kidushin, and not
the details of the contract).
(c) When we ask that we also find Kesef 'Ba'al Korchah' by an Amah
ha'Ivriyah, we mean - that the girl is acquired against her will (even
though her father gives his consent).
2. ... Bi'ah from Kesef and Sh'tar - because it is less common than they are
(since one can acquire land and Avadim with them).
3. ... Kesef from Sh'tar and Bi'ah - because there are occasions where they
both take effect against the will of the other party (by a Get and a
Yevamah, respectively), but not Kesef.
(d) We answer - that nevertheless, we do find the concept of Kesef against
the will of the woman in connection with the laws of marriage.
(a) Rav Huna maintains that Chupah also acquires a woman, and he derives it
from a 'Kal va'Chomer' from Kesef. We initially think - that Chupah enables
the newly-wed wife of a Kohen to eat Terumah, which Kesef does not.
(b) We refute this however, from a statement by Ula, who, based on the Pasuk
"ve'Kohen Ki Yikneh Nefesh Kinyan Kaspo" - learns that, min ha'Torah, an
Arusah may eat Terumah (seeing as she is included in 'Kinyan Kaspo' of the
(c) The Rabbanan decreed otherwise - because they were afraid that she might
feed her siblings a nice cup of Terumah wine that her Chasan gave her.
(d) The basis of Rav Huna's 'Kal va'Chomer' is - the fact that Chupah
concludes the Kinyan, whereas Kesef cannot do that.
(a) We just cited Rav Huna, who learns that Chupah acquires a woman from a
'Kal va'Chomer' from Kesef. Bi'ah dispels the Pircha that Kesef acquires
Hekdesh and Ma'aser Sheini. We nevertheless need Kesef too. We cannot learn
Chupah from a 'Kal va'Chomer' from Bi'ah alone - because Bi'ah has the
advantage over Chupah that it acquires a Yevamah.
(b) Neither can we learn Chupah from these two alone, because the woman
receives benefit from them both, which she does not do from Chupah. So we
bring Sh'tar into the 'Tzad ha'Shaveh'. We cannot learn Chupah from Sh'tar
alone - because Sh'tar has the advantage over Chupah that it sends away a
(c) The Tzad ha'Shaveh of them all is that they acquire elsewhere (not by
Kidushin). Chupah acquires - the woman regarding nullifying her Nedarim
whilst she is alive, and inheriting and burying her after her death.
(d) The Chachamim disagree with Rav Huna, because they have a Pircha on his
'Kal va'Chomer'. Kesef, Sh'tar and Bi'ah they argue, can all apply against
the will of the other person, whereas Chupah cannot. Rav Huna counters this
Pircha - with the argument that we do not find *Kesef* acquiring against the
will of the other party with regard to marriage (as we learned earlier).
(a) Rava asks two Kashyos on Rav Huna: Firstly, he asks, our Mishnah
specifies three ways of acquiring, and not four. Secondly - how can Rav Huna
learn that Chupah should acquire without Kesef from the fact that it
acquires with Kesef?
(b) Abaye refutes Rava's first Kashya. He justifies the Tana's omission of
Chupah from the list - by virtue of the fact that the Tana only lists the
methods of acquiring that are mentioned explicitly in the Torah (but
precludes Chupah, which is derived from a D'rashah).
(c) And he refutes his second Kashya by pointing out that this is precisely
what Rav Huna meant - if Kesef, which cannot complete the Kinyan after it
(Kesef) began the process, nevertheless acquires, then Chupah, which can,
should certainly acquire.
(a) The Tana says - that if a man gives a woman money or value of money to a
woman and says 'Harei At Mekudeshes Li', 'Harei At Me'ureses Li', Harei At
Li li'Intu', then she is betrothed.
(b) In the Seifa, he says that in the event that she gives him the money and
says 'Hareini Mekudeshes Lecha ... ', she is not Mekudeshes?
(c) Rav Papa points out that the implication from the Reisha (that in the
case of 'Nasan Hu ve'Amrah Hi', the woman is *not Mekudeshes*), clashes with
the implication from the Seifa (that she *is*).
(a) We reject the suggestion that the Tana was specific in the Reisha, but
not in the Seifa (where the Tana speaks about 'Nasnah Hi ve'Amrah Hi', but
really means to incorporate 'Nasan Hu ve'Amrah Hi') - on the grounds that a
Tana should not have written a Lashon which incorporates other things, if
the Lashon itself, by virtue of its implication, clashes with another
section of the Beraisa.
(b) We initially reconcile the Reisha with the Seifa - by explaining the
Beraisa the Seifa to mean - that 'Nasan Hu ve'Amrah Hi' is considered as
ineffective as 'Nasnah Hi ve'Amrah Hi'.
(c) Alternatively, both the Reisha and the Seifa are specific, and there is
no discrepancy - because 'Nasan Hu ve'Amrah Hi' is a Safek, fitting neither
into the Reisha nor into the Seifa.
(d) The Halachah by 'Nasan Hu ve'Amrah Hi' is - Chayshinan mi'de'Rabbanan,
and she requires a Get from both men (Note: The Lashon 'mi'de'Rabbanan' is
unclear. See Ran).
(a) Shmuel says that, if a man gives a woman a P'rutah and says to her ...
1. ... 'Harei At Mekudeshes; 'Harei At Me'uereses; 'Harei At le'Intu -
Mekudeshes - Mekudeshes'.
(b) Similarly, Shmuel concludes that if a man says to his wife - 'Eini
Ishech; 'Eini Ba'alech; 'Eini Arusech ... Ein Ka'an Beis Michush'.
2. ... 'Hareini Ishech; 'Hareini Ba'alech, 'Hareini Arusech - Ein Ka'an Beis
(c) The ramifications of 'Ein Ka'an Beis Michush' by ...
1. ... Kidushin are - that she is not even Safek Mekudeshes, and does not
therefore require a Get from the man.
2. ... Gerushin are - that she is permitted to marry a Kohen.
(a) Rav Papa asked Abaye whether Shmuel really holds 'Yadayim she'Ein
Mochichos Havyan Yadayim' - because in the first three cases of Kidushin, he
ruled 'Mekudeshes', despite the fact that the man omitted the word 'Li'
(with possible connotations of his having betrothed her to someone else).
Shmuel speaks when he said 'Li', as we just explained, and his Chidush lies
in the Seifa (of both Kidushin and Gerushin respectively), where the man's
words are not effective ...
(b) Shmuel established the Mishnah in Nazir 'ha'Omer Ehei, Harei Zeh
Nazir' - when a Nazir was walking in front of him.
(c) Otherwise - he might have meant 'Ehei be'Ta'anis'. And we extrapolate
from there - that in fact, Shmuel holds 'Yadayim she'Ein Mochichos, Lo
(d) In order to resolve the obvious discrepancy between Shmuel's two
statements, we amend his first statement to include 'Li' in all the
statements of Kidushin.
1. ... by Kidushin - because the Torah writes "Ki Yikach Ish Ishah", 've'Lo
she'Yikach es Atzmo'.
2. ... Gerushin is - because the Torah writes "ve'Shilchah", 've'Lo
she'Yishlach es Atzmo'.