ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Kesuvos 85
(a) Avimi Brei de'Rebbi Avahu sent money that he owed the B'nei Chuza'a with
Chama Brei de'Rabah bar Avuhah, to pay back his loan. When, after having
paid, Chama asked for a receipt - the B'nei Chuza'a replied 'Sitra'ah
Ninhu'. What they meant was that, in fact, Avimi owed them money from
another undocumented loan, and that they considered the money that they
received to be payment for that loan.
(b) The case came before Rebbi Avahu, who believed the B'nei Chuza'a that
there was indeed another loan - on the grounds of a 'Migu', because there
were no witnesses who saw Chama handing them the money, and they could
therefore have denied having received payment.
(c) The question then arises whether Chama was Chayav to pay Avimi for his
negligence - because he should not have paid them the money before asking
them for the document.
(d) Rav Ashi contended that it depended upon whether Avimi first instructed
him to take the Sh'tar and then pay the money or vice-versa. We repudiate
this contention however - on the grounds that a Sh'liach must always do what
is best for the person who sent him, irrespective of what he was
specifically told to do ('le'Tikuni Sh'lachticha ve'Lo la'Avasasi').
(a) When the heirs of a certain woman's deceased husband asked her for the
bag-full of documents that he had deposited by her - she replied that she
had already taken ownership of it during her husband's lifetime in payment
of money that he owed her.
(b) Rav Nachman ruled that she must return it to them - on the grounds that,
since she had no witnesses that her husband had asked her for them during
his lifetime and that she had refused, she could only be considered as
having made Tefisah after her husband's death.
(c) She could not make a Tefisah during her husband's lifetime (other than
on the conditions specified by Rav Nachman) - because the documents were
already in her possession in the form of a Pikadon (and Tefisah is only
effective if the object is transferred from the owner's domain to that of
(a) When Rav Chisda's daughter told Rava (her husband) that the woman whom
he was about to obligate to swear was suspected of swearing falsely - he
forbade her to swear, transferring the Shevu'ah to the claimant instead.
(b) When, on another occasion, Rav Papa claimed that he knew a certain
document, which Rava was on the verge of validating, to have been paid - he
asked him whether he had another witness to combine with him (because one
witness alone is not believed).
(c) Rav Ada bar Masna, who was present at the time, asked him why Rav Papa
was less reliable than bas Rav Chisda - to which he replied that whereas he
could vouch with absolute certainty that his wife would not lie under any
circumstances, he could not do the same with regard to Rav Papa.
(d) Rav Papa learned from the incident with bas Rav Chisda - that the word
of someone in whom one has implicit faith that they always told the truth
(such as Aba Mar his son) could be trusted, to the extent that one could
invalidate a document through his word alone (though not to tear it up -
which would be tantamount to extracting money through one witness).
(a) When that woman was about to swear in the Beis-Din of Rav Bibi bar
Abaye - her opponent requested that she be made to swear in town, where she
was more likely to be (too) embarrassed (to swear falsely) and confess.
(b) The woman responded by asking Rav Bibi bar Abaye to write her in advance
a document granting her ownership of whatever it was that they were claiming
from her on the assumption that she swears.
(c) When Rav Bibi bar Abaye acceded to her request - Rav Papi objected on
the grounds that to write such a document before she had even sworn,
appeared dishonest, and was therefore prohibited (see Tosfos DH 'Alma').
(d) He referred to Rav Bibi's family as 'descending from Mula'i' - because
they descended from the family of Eli, who were all Chayav *Kareis* (which
is the meaning of '*Mula'i*'), or it is a certain kind of blemish, hinting
at that family which were blemished, inasmuch as they did not live as long
as other people.
(a) Rav Papi based his objection on a statement by Rava, who issued a ruling
concerning an Asharta de'Dayni - the Beis-Din's official confirmation of a
(b) Rava said that an 'Asharta de'Dayni' which the Beis-Din wrote before the
witnesses had actually verified their signatures - is invalid, because it
appears to be a lie.
(c) Rav Nachman quoted Rebbi Meir, who legalized an unsigned document that
they found in the trash-heap - proving that the argument that whatever
appears false is invalid is confined to the realm of the Beis-Din's
confirmation of a document, but that it does extend to validity of the
(d) There is no counter-proof from the Rabbanan, who disagree with Rebbi
Meir - because they only disagree with him regarding Gitin, which need to be
written li'Sh'mah (with specific motivation), but agree with him that other
documents are valid.
(a) We prove that Rebbi Meir's opinion is unanimous from a statement by
Rebbi Yochanan. Rebbi Yochanan says - that a document of loan that has
already been repaid, may not be re-used because its right to claim has
already been used up.
(b) We infer from there - that if not for the fact that its right to claim
has already been used up - it would be Kasher, despite the fact that it
appears dishonest (since the wording on the document refers to a different
(a) When Rav Meyasha the grandson of Rebbi Yehoshua ben Levi died suddenly,
leaving seven pearls wrapped in a cloth - the root of the problem that arose
was the fact that he had not had a chance to inform his family that the
pearls were deposited with him (and were not his own).
(b) Rebbi Ami permitted the depositor to retrieve the pearls - on the
grounds that a. Rebbi Ami was not a wealthy man (making it most likely that
they were deposited) and b. that he gave the correct Simanim (signs of
(c) Rebbi Ami would not have permitted him to take them - had he visited
Rebbi Meyasha regularly (because then he may well have seen the pearls
there, and his identification would not have been acceptable).
(d) Similar incidents occurred with Chasa and with Rav Dimi, who both died
suddenly without stating that the articles that they left behind were
deposited with them. There too, Rav Nachman permitted the depositor to
retrieve his article from Chasa, and Rebbi Aba from Rav Dimi, for the same
reasons as Rebbi Ami.
What the owner deposited ...
1. ... with Chasa - was a silver goblet.
2. ... with Rav Dimi - was silks.
(a) If a man on his deathbed leaves his property to Tuvya, and in walks ...
1. ... Tuvya - then we will give the property to him.
(b) We would however, give the property even to Rav Tuvya - if he was known
to be a good friend of the deceased, because people do tend to drop the
title when speaking to, or about, a close friend.
2. ... Rav Tuvya - we will not give him the property (because the deceased
said Tuvya, and not Rav Tuvya).
(c) If, when two Tuvyas arrive, one turns out to be ...
1. ... a neighbor and the other, a Talmid-Chacham - we give it to the
latter, because we assume that, when a person reaches that stage, a person
wants to amass as many merits as possible, as Chazal have said ('All the
prophets only prophesied [good] regarding those who benefit
Talmidei-Chachamim with their property.
(d) If they are both neighbors, both relatives or both Talmidei-Chachamim -
then Beis-Din give it to the one whom they assess the deceased would prefer
to give it (see also Tosfos DH 'Shuda de'Dayna').
2. ... a neighbor and the other, a relative - the neighbor takes precedence,
due to the Pasuk in Mishlei "Tov Shachen Tov, me'Ach Rachok".
(a) Rava told the son of Rav Chiya bar Avin something wonderful that his
father, commenting on a statement of Shmuel's, had said. Shmuel said that if
a creditor who sold a Sh'tar Chov (a document of debt) subsequently absolved
the debtor - the latter is Patur from paying. Note, that the creditor is
obligated to reimburse the purchaser (because he caused him a loss - see
Tosfos 86a. DH 'Teizil').
(b) The reason for this Halachah is - because the debtor can say to the
purchaser 'I have no dealings with you (only with my creditor, whom I no
longer owe anything)'.
(c) This Halachah applies even after the creditor's death - since the
creditor's heirs inherit the right to forego the debtor.
(d) Rav Chiya bar Avin comments on this, that if a woman brings a Sh'tar
Chov into her marriage, and subsequently absolves the debtor from paying,
the debtor remains Chayav to pay her husband - because Chazal gave her
husband equal rights to her (as if they were partners) as we learned
(a) A relation of Rav Nachman's sold her Kesuvah (for whatever it was worth
to the buyer), got divorced and died. When the purchaser came to claim the
Kesuvah from his relations daughter (who was claiming her mother's Kesuvah
from her father) - Rav Nachman asked (out of Beis-Din) whether there was
nobody who would advise her to absolve the debtor from paying'?
(b) The Dayan ...
1. ... is not permitted to advise defendants in Beis-Din.
(c) Rav Nachman nevertheless regretted having done what he did - because, as
a great man, people would learn from him to do so even to strangers (where
there is no Heter whatsoever to do so).
2. ... is not permitted to advise them out of Beis-Din either - unless they
are his relatives, in which case, Yeshayah said "u'mi'Besarcha al Tis'alem".