ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Kesuvos 59
1. Rav Ada bar Ahavah amends the Beraisa 'Tiknu Mezonos Tachas Ma'aseh
Yadehah' - to 'Tiknu Mezonos Tachas *Mosar* Ma'seh Yadehah'.
(b) Even though the Tana goes on to state the amount that the woman is
obligated to produce, the latter Beraisa can pertain to Mosar - because one
needs to know how much the basic Ma'aseh is, in order to now what is
2. Rav and Shmuel amend the Beraisa 'Im Eino Nosen Lah Ma'ah Kesef
le'Tzorchehah, Ma'aseh Yadehah she'Lah' - to 'Im Eino Nosen Lah Ma'ah Kesef
le'Tzorchehah, *Mosar* Ma'aseh Yadehah she'Lah'.
(a) The Tana Kama in the Mishnah in Kidushin states that if a married woman
declares the work of her hands a Konam, her husband *does not need to
nullify* her Neder - because, seeing as the work of her hands belong to him,
her Neder is inaffective.
(b) Rebbi Akiva maintains that he *does* - because she might produce Mosar
(see Tosfos DH 'Rebbi Akiva').
(c) Shmuel rules like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri, who rules like Rebbi Akiva -
but because we are afraid that her husband may divorce her, in which case
her Neder will come into effect, preventing him from ever taking her back
(seeing as it is impossible to live with a woman from whose work one is
forbidden to benefit).
(d) Shmuel also rules like Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar in our Mishnah.
Considering that, on the previous Amud, Shmuel agreed with Rav (that, when
Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar considers the Mosar of a woman whose husband
declared the work of her hands Hekdesh, he is referring to the Mosar after
her death), Shmuel's two rulings appear contradictory - because, according
to Rav and Shmuel's interpretation, Rebbi Yochanan ha'Sandlar holds 'Ein
Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam', whereas Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri
clearly holds 'Adam Makneh Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam'.
(a) We try to reconcile Shmuel's two rulings by establishing his ruling like
Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri by Ha'adafah (Mosar). In fact, this does this not
really answer the question - because the Ha'adafah is no more 'Ba le'Olam'
than the Ma'aseh Yadehah (even more so considering that she is not yet
(b) Besides that, we object to this answer because, if that is so, Shmuel
should have said 'Halachah ke'Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri le'Ha'adafah' (seeing
as Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri himself, even according to Shmuel, does not
speak exclusively about Ha'adafah). Or he could have said - 'Ein Halachah
ke'Tana Kama' (who says 'Ein Tzarich Lehafer') or 'Halachah ke'Rebbi Akiva'
(who says 'Yafer Shema Ta'adif').
(c) Rav Yosef resolves the contradiction in Shmuel's rulings, by pointing
out that Konamos (which are the topic under discussion in the Mishnah in
Kidushin) are different. Konamos are unique - inasmuch as (unlike Hekdesh),
one can forbid someone else's object on oneself only by means of a Konam.
Consequently, he argues, we should be able to extend their uniqueness to
cover 'Davar she'Lo Bo le'Olam'.
(d) Abaye refutes Rav Yosef's answer however, on the grounds that the reason
that one can forbid one's friend's object on oneself exclusively is because
one can also forbid one's own object on one's friend exclusively; but
perhaps one cannot forbid a Davar she'Lo Ba le'Olam any more than one can
forbid one's friend's objects on himself.
(a) So Rav Huna Brei de'Rav Yehoshua establishes the Mishnah in Kidushin
when she declares Hekdesh, not her Ma'aseh Yadayim, but her hands (with
regard to what they produce). We object to that however - on the grounds
that her hands, together with the work that they produce, are Meshubad to
her husband, so how can she declare them Hekdesh?
(b) We also object to the suggestion that she does not declare them Hekdesh
now, only after she is divorced, on the grounds that something that one does
not want to declare Hekdesh immediately, one cannot declare Hekdesh now for
later either. Rebbi Yirmiyah differentiates between this case and that of
Rebbi Ila'a, who rules that if someone declares Hekdesh a field that he is
about to sell to his friend, but that the Hekdesh should only come into
effect after he has bought it back from his friend, the Hekdesh is indeed
effective - because there, he could have declared the field Hekdesh
immediately, whereas in our case, she could not have done so.
(c) If someone declares Hekdesh a field that he just sold to his friend for
the Hekdesh to take effect the moment he buys it back - his declaration is
invalid (because he would have been unable to declare it Hekdesh immediately
even if he had wanted to).
(d) But that is because he owns neither the field nor the Peiros (the
current rights to it), argues Rav Papa - whereas in our case, where the
woman owns her hands, maybe her declaration will be valid.
(a) So we try to compare our case to a case where a person declares Hekdesh
a field that he gave to his friend as collateral for a loan the moment he
redeems it. There the Hekdesh is valid. Nevertheless ...
1. ... Rav Shisha Brei de'Rav Idi differentiates between that case and
ours - on the grounds that there, he is able to redeem the field, whereas
the woman is not able to obtain a divorce (on her volition).
(b) We finally establish Shmuel's ruling like Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri on the
grounds that Konamos are different, like Rava - who says that Hekdesh
negates a creditor's Shibud.
2. ... we differentiate between our case and that of a case similar to the
previous one, only when the owner fixed the collateral for ten years time
(in which case he cannot redeem it until then) - on the grounds that there,
he will at least be able to redeem the field in ten year's time, whereas the
woman will never be able to obtain a divorce.
(c) He is referring specifically to Hekdesh of Kedushas ha'Guf (such as an
ox that he declared a Korban and which had previously been Meshubad to his
creditor); but not to Kedushas Damim (such as Bedek ha'Bayis - Hekdesh's
(d) This is not considered stealing from the creditor - seeing as the
article does not belong to him. It is no more than a collateral, and now
that he has lost it, he retains the right to claim from other sources.
(a) The other two cases which have the power to remove the Shibud - are 1.
'Chametz': If someone designated his Chametz as collateral for a Nochri
(without actually placing it in his domain), he becomes obligated to destroy
it on Erev Pesach; 2. Shichrur: If someone sets free his slave whom he
designated as collateral, he goes free.
(b) That is indeed Rebbi Yochanan ben Nuri's reasoning. Nevertheless, he
maintains that the Konam takes effect only *after* the woman is divorced -
because Chazal reinforced the husband's rights over his wife's property,
giving him the Din of a buyer rather than a creditor.
(a) Grinding, baking, washing clothes, cooking and feeding one's baby - are
all Melachos that a woman is obligated to perform for her husband (the
latter to save him the expense of hiring a wet-nurse).
(b) The other two Melachos belong in this list - are making his bed and
manufacturing woollen clothes.
(c) In the event that she brings a Shifchah Kena'anis into the marriage - -
she becomes exempt from grinding, baking and washing his clothes.
(d) If she brings in two Shefachos, she is also exempt from cooking and
personally feeding her baby. If she brings in ...
1. ... three - she is also exempt from - making his bed and manufacturing
2. ... four - she can relax all day (and is not even obligated to carry his
things up to the attic).
(a) According to Rebbi Eliezer, she is never exempt from manufacturing
woollen clothes (even if she brings in a hundred Shefachos) - because
idleness leads to immorality.
(b) Rebbi Shimon ben Gamliel says that someone who makes a Neder forbidding
his wife from working - is obligated to divorce her and to pay her Kesuvah,
because idleness leads to senility.
(a) The word 'Tochenes' used by the Tana for 'grinding', appears to be
incorrect, because it is not the woman who actually grinds but the water
which turns the wheel, which operates the mill, so we amend the Lashon
'Tochenes' to 'Mat'cheness'
(b) 'Mat'chenes' - implies pouring the grain into the mill and removing the
(c) Alternatively - our Mishnah could be speaking about a hand-mill, in
which case, the word 'Tochenes' is appropriate.
(a) The author of our Mishnah cannot be the Tana quoted by Rebbi Chiya in a
Beraisa - in whose opinion, the main objective of a woman is to look
beautiful, since this clashes with some of the Melachos (such as grinding,
baking and feeding her baby, which all detract from her beauty).
(b) Rebbi Chiya lists this objective together with having children. In a
second Beraisa - he adds the wearing of ornaments.
(c) If a man wants to enhance his wife's looks, he should dress her in linen
clothes (though this, as well as other statements made in this Sugya, are
not necessarily true today). Besides feeding her young birds - he should
give her plenty of milk to drink as she approaches the age of maturity
(Na'arus at twelve).
(a) According to Beis Hillel in a Beraisa, if a woman made a Neder not to
feed her baby, we nevertheless force her to do so. According to Beis
Shamai - we force her to stop even if she is in the middle of feeding.
(b) Once she is divorced however, Beis Hillel concede that her Neder stands
and must be kept. And they will agree with Beis Shamai even during the
marriage - if it is clear that the baby recognizes its mother, and refuses
to feed from anybody else (due to life danger), in which case, her husband
is obligated to pay *her* to feed the baby.
(c) We try to establish the Beraisa when the woman made the Neder but her
husband upheld it - in which case Beis Shamai's reason is because it is as
if was *he* who made the Neder. In principle however, Beis Shamai agree that
the woman is obligated to feed her baby for her husband.
(a) We conclude however, that Beis Shamai cannot be the author of our
Mishnah, because if their bone of contention is really who is responsible
for the Neder that the wife made and the husband upholds, then they should
have argued in a straight case of Kesuvah. Their Machlokes would then have
been - whether, if the husband upheld his wife's Neder not to provide him
with any benefit, she goes out with a Kesuvah (Beis Shamai) or without it
(b) We also reject the possibility of establishing our Mishnah like Beis
Shamai - on the basis of a Beraisa, which Beis Shamai say 'Einah Meinekes'
(with or without a Neder) should she not wish to do so.