ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Kama 112
BAVA KAMA 112 - Today's Daf has been dedicated by Mr. Kenneth Polinsky in
honor of his wife, Dvora Risa, and children, Miriam, Elisheva, Tzvi and
Avigayil. May Hashem grant them the health, strength and peace of mind to
continue to support Torah and raise their children as Yere'ei Shamayim.
(a) Rav Ada bar Ahavah cites Rami bar Chama in connection with the following
Beraisa. 'Hini'ach Lahen Avihen Ma'os shel Ribis, af-al-Pi she'Yod'in
whe'Hein shel Ribis, Ein Chayavin Le'hachzir', from which Rami bar Chama
proves - 'Reshus Yoresh ki'Reshus Loke'ach'.
(b) Rava refutes the proof by citing the Pasuk "Al Tikach me'Ito Neshech
ve'Sarbis". The Torah forbids the taking of Ribis - to ensure that the
borrower 'can live with the creditor' (as the Pasuk concludes "ve'Chei
(c) Rava refutes Rami's proof, from this Pasuk - which seems specifically to
confine the obligation of returning Ribis to the owner to the lender
(precluding the heirs from a Gezeiras ha'Kasuv irrespective of whether they
acquire the Ribis or not).
(a) If Rami bar Chama argues with Rava with regard to the Beraisa, he will
certainly argue with him with regard to our Mishnah. The reverse might not
be true - because of Rava's Limud from the Pasuk (in which case he will
agree with Rava, even though there has been no Yi'ush).
(b) Others reverse the above statement. According to them, Rami bar Chama
might argue with Rava with regard to the Beraisa, but he will agree with
regard to the Mishnah - because it is possible to establish the Mishnah when
the heirs ate the Gezeilah (in which case they are Patur from paying
anyway - as Rava explained above).
(c) The preferred version is the first one (though according to some, it is
(a) Regarding the case of 'ha'Gozel u'Ma'achil es ha'Ganav, the Beraisa
obligates Gedolim, but exempts Ketanim from paying - because they cannot, as
a rule, be taken to court (the author of this Beraisa is Sumchus, as we
shall see later).
(b) Rami bar Chama establishes the first statement - before Yi'ush.
(c) The Beraisa adds that if the Gedolim say 'Ein Anu Yod'in Cheshbonos
she'Chishev Avinu Imach'. This cannot however, be taken literally - because,
seeing as they admit that they received the Gezeilah, we would then apply
the principle 'Bari ve'Shema, Bari Adif'.
(d) Rava therefore establishes that what they actually said was - that they
do in fact, know about their father's dealings with the owner, and that
nothing remains unpaid (turning it into a case of 'Bari u'Bari').
(a) Yet another Beraisa obligates both Gedolim and Ketanim to pay for the
stolen cow which their father left them. The problem with this Beraisa is -
why Yesomim Ketanim should be any more Chayav than when their ox entered the
Nizak's Chatzer and caused damage (where they are Patur, because they cannot
be taken to Beis-Din to claim from their property).
(b) Rav Papa therefore establishes the Beraisa - when the animal is still
available to be reclaimed. Consequently, seeing as they admit that they
received it, there is no reason why the owner should not take it back.
(c) The author of this Beraisa is - Sumchus, as we shall soon see.
(a) Rava rules that, Yesomim whose father leaves them a borrowed cow, are
permitted to use it until the prescribed time expires - but they are Patur
(b) In a case where, believing the cow to be their father's, they Shecht it
and eat it - they are obligated to pay for cheap meat (which amounts to two
thirds of the market-price of what they ate).
(a) If their father left them Karka, Rava concludes, they are Chayav. Some
learn this with regard to the Reisha (obligating them to pay Onsin) - and it
goes without saying that in the Seifa, seeing as they actually ate the meat,
they will be obligated to pay in full for the animal that they Shechted)
from that field.
(b) Others learn Rava's final statement with regard to the Seifa (where they
actually ate the meat). But in the Reisha - Rava would hold that they are
(c) On the one hand, Rava might ...
1. ... obligate the Yesomim to pay in the Reisha - because he holds that the
Chiyuv to pay Onsin began when the father borrowed the ox.
2. ... exempt them - if he holds that the obligation only begins when the
O'nes takes place, and since, in this case, that occurred under the
jurisdiction of the Yesomim, the fact that their father left Karka will not
help to obligate them.
(a) Rava's ruling is connected to a similar ruling of Rav Papa. Rav Papa
says that someone who Shechted a cow on Shabbos ...
1. ... which he stole before Shabbos - must pay Daled ve'Hey, since the
obligation to pay Keren fell due already before Shabbos, and his Chiyuv
Miysah for Shechting on Shabbos does not exempt his from paying Daled
ve'Hey, which is a K'nas (as we have learned in Kesuvos).
(b) The reason that he is Patur from
2. ... which he borrowed before Shabbos - is Patur from Keren as well as
from Daled ve'Hey.
1. ... Keren is - because he is Chayav Miysah for breaking Shabbos, and Rav
papa holds that the Chiyuvim of a Shomer only take effect at the time when
something happens to the animal. Consequently, the Chiyuvim of the Shomer
and the Chiyuv Miysah occurred simultaneously, and he is Patur from the
(c) The second Lashon of Rava follows the opinion of his Talmid Rav Papa.
2. ... Kefel, Daled ve'Hey - because these Chiyuvim only apply to a Ganav or
a To'en Ta'anas Ganav.
(d) We reject the text which exempts the borrower from Daled ve'Hey for
Shechting the cow on Shabbos, on the grounds that wherever there is no
Keren, there is no Kefel, Daled or Hey either - because the reason that we
gave is more basic than this one (since, as we explained, Kefel, Daled
ve'Hey do not apply to them in the first place).
(a) In view of the current Sugya, the Tana of the Beraisa extrapolates from
the Pasuk "ve'Heishiv es ha'Gezeilah *Asher Gazal*" - that the Yesomim are
only required to return the stolen object that their father left, if it is
(b) The Tana adds that if on the other hand, the object *is* intact, both
Gedolim and Ketanim are obligated to return it - Sumchus however, exempts
the Ketanim from returning it.
(a) Rebbi Yirmiyah's young brother-in law locked the door in front of Rebbi
Yirmiyah - to prevent him from acquiring the house upon the death of his
(b) Rebbi Avin declined to accept Rebbi Yirmiyah's witnesses, who were ready
to testify that he had already acquired the house during the lifetime of his
father-in-law, who had sold or given it to him - based on the principle that
one cannot accept witnesses in the absence of one's disputant (and a Katan
is always considered absent).
(c) Rebbi Avin justifies his ruling - according to Sumchus, who says
'Ketanim Peturin', at which expressed surprise that they should rule like an
individual opinion to deprive him of his rights.
(d) Rebbi Avahu, who then became involved in the case, tried to support
Rebbi Yirmiyah with a statement by Rav Yosef bar Chama, who said - that if a
Katan takes his Avadim with him to forcibly claim a field from the current
owner (or to forcibly take away the Eved), we do not wait until the Katan
grows up to retrieve it from him. We do so immediately.
(e) We differentiate between the two cases however, by pointing out - that -
whereas Rav Yosef bar Chama is speaking when the Katan has no prior
Chazakah, in our current case, Rebbi Yirmiyah's brother-in-law has the
backing of a Chazakah from his father (vindicating Rebbi Avin's ruling).
(a) 'Amar Rav Ashi Amar Rav Shabsa'i Mekablin Eidim she'Lo bi'F'nei
Ba'al-Din'. Rebbi Yossi b'Rebbi Chanina explains this statement - when
either the creditor or the witnesses are very ill or when the witnesses are
planning to go overseas (and will no longer be available when they become
(b) In addition - the Beis-Din must have issued him with a summons, which he
(c) Mar Ukva explains the identical statement issued by Rav Yehudah Amar
Shmuel - when, after opening the proceedings, the Beis-Din issued him with a
summons, which he ignored.
1. This would not apply if they had not yet opened the proceedings against
him - because then, he could claim that he wants to go to the Beis-Din
ha'Gadol in Eretz Yisrael ...
2. ... which he cannot claim once the proceedings have begun, assuming that
the local Beis-Din has a letter from the Beis-Din ha'Gadol requesting that
they take the case in hand.
(a) 'Kiyum ha'Sh'tar' is - the substantiation of a document, which entails
the witnesses verifying their signatures in front of Beis-Din and Beis-Din's
adding their stamp of approval.
(b) According to Rav, should the witnesses wish to go overseas, the claimant
is entitled to substantiate the Sh'tar even in the absence of the defendant.
Rebbi Yochanan - prohibits it.
(c) Rav Sheishes derives Rebbi Yochanan's opinion from the Pasuk "ve'Hu'ad
bi'Ve'alav ve'Lo Yishmerenu" - from which we learn that the owner of the ox
must stand beside his ox whilst it is being sentence (in other words,
without the owner being present, he cannot be implicated. By the same token,
without the defendant being present, he cannot be implicated by means of the
Sh'tar being substantiated).
(d) Rava rules like Rav ...
1. ... even if the defendant vehemently objects that the Sh'tar is a
2. ... but not if he asks for time to bring witnesses who will prove the
Sh'tar false, in which case we wait until his return.
(a) If Monday, Thursday and Monday pass, and he has not returned, Beis-Din
write a Pesicha, and ninety days later, an Adrachta.
1. A Pesicha is - a Sh'tar placing the debtor in Cherem for not paying his
(b) The significance of the first set of thirty days is that we assume him
to be looking for a loan. The significance of ...
2. ... an Adrachta - is a Sh'tar authorizing the creditor to go and find a
suitable field for assessment against his debt, which will then be sold.
1. ... the second set is - that, not having found an available loan, we
assume that he is looking for a purchaser to buy his property.
(c) In the event that the defendant declares at the outset that he is not
accepting the summons to Beis-Din - we write an Adrachata immediately.
2. ... the third set - that the purchaser himself is looking for the cash to
pay for the field.
(d) And we write an Adrachta immediately in the case of a Pikadon - because
he has no excuse to delay returning it.
(a) Initially, we ascribe the fact that we do not write an Adrachta on
Metaltelin - to the fact that the creditor will eat up all the Metaltelin,
and, should the debtor turn up with witnesses, he will be unable to retrieve
(b) We would however, write one - if the creditor had Karka (which the
debtor could subsequently claim should the need arise).
(c) We conclude however, that Beis-Din do not write an Adrachta on
Metaltelin - because we are also afraid that, even if the creditor possesses
Karka, its value may drop, and the debtor will lose out. Note that the
creditor is assured of obtaining his money, because, until he does, the
debtor is in Cherem (Rosh). Also bear in mind that the moment the debtor
refuses to pay, we write an Adrachta on Metaltelin, too.
(d) Beis-Din will inform the defendant when writing an Adrachta on his
property. They will not do so - in the event that he lives too far away to
reach (as we shall se shortly).
(a) We initially think that Beis-Din will inform the defendant, even if he
is overseas - if he either has relatives (whom we will inform in his place),
or if there are caravans, in which case, we will give the caravan time to go
(b) We think that in this case, Beis-Din wait a further twelve months before
giving the Adrachta to the claimant - but conclude that, on the assumption
that the initial ruling to write an Adrachta was made at Monday's sitting of
Beis-Din, we wait for the Sheli'ach Beis-Din to leave on Tuesday and return
on Wednesday (i.e. one day's journey), in time to hand the Adrachta to the
creditor at Thursday's sitting. Should the debtor, currently be residing
further afield, we do not wait at all, but write the Adrachta immediately on
Monday (since he is to blame for traveling so far at such a crucial time.
(c) We refute the original contention, in spite of the episode with Ravina,
who made Mar Acha (whose debtor was in Mechuza) wait twelve months for his
Adrachta until the caravans returned from Mechuza and he could inform him
upon his return - on the ground that Ravina's ruling was confined to that
case, because Mar Acha was a tough guy, and the debtor would not have been
able to retrieve his property, once it fell into Mar Acha's hands.
(a) Ravina rules that a Sheli'ach Beis-Din who informs Beis-Din that one of
the litigants refuses to accept the summons is believed like two witnesses.
But this only pertains to a Shamta (an oral Cherem), not to a Pesicha (a
written one) - because the litigant concerned is obligated to pay the
Sofer's fee, and the credibility of the Sheli'ach Beis-Din does not extend
to money matters.
(b) He also rules that Beis-Din will even issue a litigant who is due back
in town with a summons to a Din Torah, through a woman or neighbors who
happen to be going that way. This will not apply to a case where ...
1. ... the litigant is currently at home (i.e. in the same town as
Beis-Din) - because they will probably not carry out their Shelichus,
thinking that the Sheli'ach Beis-Din probably met the litigant and informed
2. ... the litigant is due to pass the entrance to Beis-Din on his way
home - because then they will think that Beis-Din will probably inform him
anyway, as he walks past.
3. ... he is not due to return that day - because they will probably forget
to tell him when he does.