ANSWERS TO REVIEW QUESTIONS
prepared by Rabbi Eliezer Chrysler
Kollel Iyun Hadaf, Jerusalem
Previous daf Bava Kama 90
We have just explained the Machlokes between the two Beraisos (whether
'Nechsei Mi'lug Yotz'in le'Ishah ve'Lo le'Ish', or 'Lo le'Ishah ve'Lo
le'Ish') in one of four ways. It is based on 1. ... the principle of Takanas
Usha; 2. ... the fact that one was learned before the Takanah, and the
other, after it; 3. ... Rava's principle (whether 'Hekdesh, Chametz
ve'Shichrur Mafki'in Miydei Shibud' or not); 4. whether Takanas Usha was
made to override Rava's principle or not. All explanations however, assumed
that 'Kinyan Peiros La'av ke'Kinyan ha'Guf'. All explanations however,
assume that Kinyan Peiros La'av ke'Kinyan ha'Guf. The fifth way of
reconciling the two Beraisos - is by establishing that the Tana of the
second Beraisa holds 'Kinyan Peiros ke'Kinyan ha'Guf'.
(a) Rebbi Meir in a Beraisa rules that if Reuven sells Shimon his Eved on
condition that he alone may continue to use him for the first thirty days,
the Din of "Yom O Yomayim" applies to Reuven but not to Shimon. The
ramifications of Rebbi Meir's ruling are - that if Reuven wounds the Eved
and he dies after twenty-four hours, he is Patur, whereas if Shimon does so,
he is Chayav Miysah.
(b) His ruling is based on the principle - 'Kinyan Peiros ke'Kinyan ha'Guf
(c) Rebbi Yehudah says - that the Din of "Yom O Yomayim" applies to Shimon
but not to Reuven (because he holds 'Kinyan Peiros La'av ke'Kinyan ha'Guf
(d) Rebbi Yossi holds that the Din of "Yom O Yomayim" pertains to both of
them - because he is uncertain whether 'Kinyan Peiros ke'Kinyan ha'Guf Dami'
or not. Consequently, he applies the principle 'Safek Nefashos Lehakel', and
neither receives the death-sentence.
(a) The fourth Tana is Rebbi Elazar (see Rashash), who holds - that neither
Reuven nor Shimon is subject to the Din of "Yom O Yomayim".
1. The logical reason behind Rebbi Elazar's ruling is - because neither is
the real owner; the woman because the Eved is not under her jurisdiction,
and the man, because he does not belong to him.
2. The Pasuk on which Rava bases this ruling is - that of "Ki Kaspo Hu".
(a) Ameimar establishes the Beraisa like Rebbi Elazar. The Tana says that if
a man and a woman both sold an Eved Mi'lug - the sale is invalid, even if
both signed the document of sale jointly.
(b) If two partners sold an Eved that they owned jointly - the sale would be
(c) The reason for the difference is - because in this latter case, each has
full rights in the entire Eved which entitle him to half the Eved, whereas
in the former case, neither has full rights in him, since one owns the
Peiros, and the other, the Guf.
(d) In connection with the Beraisa which rules that a Chatzi Eved and Chatzi
ben Chorin as well as an Eved belonging to two partners (see Tosfos DH
'Ish'), does not go out with Shen ve'Ayin, Rav Mordechai told Rav Ashi
quoting Rava - that the author is Rebbi Elazar.
(a) According to the Tana Kama of our Mishnah, if Reuven blew a trumpet in
Shimon's ear, he is obligated to is fined a Sela (for Bo'shes). 'ha'Tokei'a
la'Chaveiro' might also mean - someone who punched him (on the ear).
(b) Rebbi Yehudah quotes Rebbi Yossi Hagelili as saying - that he pays (not
a Sela, but) a Manah.
(c) Someone who slapped his friend's face is obligated to pay two hundred
Zuz. If he ...
1. ... slapped him with the back of his hand, he must pay - four hundred
(d) According to the Tana Kama, this all depends on the status of the person
who has been shamed (this will be explained later in the Sugya). Rebbi Akiva
says - that we consider even a poor person as if he was a rich man who had
fallen on hard times (see 86a), because he too, is a descendent of Avraham.
Yitzcahk and Ya'akov.
2. ... pulled (or nicked) his ear, spat on him, removed his cloak, or
uncovered a woman's hair in the street - he must pay four hundred Zuz, too.
(a) The Tana tells the story of Rebbi Akiva, who fined a certain man four
hundred Zuz for uncovering a woman's hair in the street. The culprit asked
for time to pay - in order to prove that the woman did not not hesitate to
uncover her own hair in public.
(b) He proved this - by breaking a barrel of oil whilst she was standing at
the entrance of her Chatzer, and appointing two witnesses, who saw how she
removed her head-covering in order to absorb some of the spilling oil.
(c) Rebbi Akiva however - was not impressed. He explained that a person who
wounded oneself is Patur (even though it is forbidden to do so), yet if
others were to wound him, they would be liable.
(d) Similarly, he added, a person who cuts down his fruit-trees is Patur
(even though it is forbidden to do so), yet if others were to do so, they
would be liable to pay.
(a) We ask whether the Sela and the Manah in our Mishnah refer to the Tzuri
system of the Medinah - which is one eighth of the former.
(b) We resolve the She'eilah from a Beraisa, where, when a man who blew a
trumpet in someone's ear was brought before him, Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah
said - 'There is I, and there is Rebbi Yossi Hagelili, who fixed the price
as a Manah Tzuri' (though this clashes with the Sugya in Perek 'Shor
she'Nagach Daled ve'Hey' - see Tosfos Yom-Tov).
(c) We query the suggestion that what he meant was that he was ruling
because he saw the episode and that Rebbi Yossi Hagelili stated the figure
as a Manah Tzuri - because then Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah would hold 'Eid
Ne'aseh Dayan' (a witness who testifies can then act as a Dayan too), which
seems to clash with both opinions in the Beraisa that we are about to
(d) In a Beraisa, Rebbi Tarfon rules that if the Sanhedrin saw Reuven murder
Shimon, some of the Dayanim adopt the role of witnesses and others of
Dayanim. Rebbi Akiva says - that since they are all potential witnesses
(seeing as they witnessed the event), they can no longer act as Dayanim.
(a) Both Tana'im agree that 'Ein Eid Na'aseh Dayan'. We initially reconcile
this with the current suggestion that what Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah meant was
that he was ruling because he had seen the episode - by establishing the
case of the Beraisa when the event took place at night, when Beis-Din cannot
convene, and which therefore requires fresh testimony in the daytime;
whereas Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah, who had witnessed the episode by day, was
able to rule by virtue of what he himself saw ('she'Lo Tehei Sheni'ah
Gedolah me'Re'iyah' [because seeing cannot be worse than hearing]).
(b) Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah then holds - like Rebbi Tarfon (see Tosfos DH
(c) Assuming that the Sanhedrin witnessed the murder by day we reinterpret
Rebbi Yehudah Nesi'ah's statement to mean - that he concurs with Rebbi Yossi
Hagelili (but ot that he saw the episode).
(a) Shimon ha'Teimani learns from the Pasuk "ve'Hikah Ish es Re'eihu be'Even
O be'Egrof" - that just as a fist ("Egrof") is available for both the
Sanhedrin and the witnesses to see, so too, must the murder weapon be
available for the Sanhedrin to see (in order to assess whether it is fit to
kill or not). Consequently, if it got lost, the murdered cannot be
(b) Rebbi Akiva disagrees with Rebbi Shimon ha'Teimani. According to him -
it will suffice if the weapon is seen by the witnesses (but not necessarily
by the Beis-Din).
(c) He argues on him on the grounds that a. the murdered did not strike the
victim in the prsence of the Beis-Din; b. they did not see where the
murderer struck the victim; 3. nor did they see the rooftop from which he
pushed him off (and certainly not if the building collapsed), yet they
believe the witnesses in all of these points. In that case, let them also
believe the witnesses with regard to the murder weapon.
(a) We can infer from Rebbi Akiva's words 've'Chi bi'F'nei Beis-Din
Hikahu' - that if the murderer would have committed the murder in front of
Beis-Din, then they would have been able to rule on the basis of what they
(b) We reconcile this with what he said earlier (that 'Ein Eid Na'aseh
Dayan') - by establishing the latter statement as being, not his own
opinion, but merely in answer to Rebbi Shimon ha'Teimani's statement.
(a) The Beraisa says that if a Shor Tam gored Reuven to death and wounded
Shimon, Beis-Din will sentence the ox to death, but will not open the case
for damages - because, seeing as a Shor Tam only pays from the body of the
ox, and in this case, the ox is destined to be stoned (in which case it will
Asur be'Hana'ah), there is no point in doing so.
(b) In the equivalent case by a Mu'ad - the Tana says that Beis-Din first
deal with the case regarding damages, and then sentence the ox to death
(because there, the owner will be able to pay for the damages from his
(c) In the event that they inadvertently dealt with the case of Miysah and
sentenced the ox to death, the Beraisa concludes - they will not open the
case of damages at all.